Following is UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s message for International Youth Day, to be observed on 12 August:

Today’s generation of youth — the largest the world has ever known, and the vast majority of whom live in developing countries — has unprecedented potential to advance the well-being of the entire human family. Yet too many young people, including those who are highly educated, suffer from low-wage, dead-end work and record levels of unemployment.

The global economic crisis has hit youth the hardest and many are understandably discouraged by rising inequalities. A large number have no immediate prospects and are disenfranchised from the political, social and development processes in their countries. Without urgent measures, we risk creating a “lost generation” of squandered talent and dreams.

Working with and for young people is one of my top priorities. Youth are a transformative force; they are creative, resourceful and enthusiastic agents of change, be it in public squares or cyberspace. From their pivotal role in efforts to achieve freedom, democracy and equality, to their global mobilization in support of the Rio+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, youth have energetically demonstrated yet again their capacity and desire to turn the tide of history and tackle global challenges.

Young men and women are not passive beneficiaries, but equal and effective partners. Their aspirations extend far beyond jobs; youth also want a seat at the table — a real voice in shaping the policies that shape their lives. We need to listen to and engage with young people. We need to establish more and stronger mechanisms for youth participation. The time has come to integrate youth voices more meaningfully into decision-making processes at all levels.

Around the world there is growing recognition of the need to strengthen policies and investments involving young people. On International Youth Day, I call on Governments, the private sector, civil society and academia to open doors for young people and strengthen partnerships with youth-led organizations. Youth can determine whether this era moves toward greater peril or more positive change.

Let us support the young people of our world so they grow into adults who raise yet more generations of productive and powerful leaders.

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Secretary-General warns against creating ‘Lost Generation of Squandered Talent and Dreams’

How to work on drugs without promoting consumption? Are there chances of recovery? When is control lost in drug use? How to work on prevention? What is harm reduction? These were some of the questions that guided the workshop "Strategies for approaching the drug problem" held on 23 and 24 July in Florencio Varela, Buenos Aires province.

In order to discuss drugs and harm reduction among those who handle religious community centers, and rethink the possibilities of action of each community center in relation to drug-related problems, a training on 

"Strategies for approaching the drug problem"

 with support from the Evangelical Church of Río de la Plata (IERP) was carried out in Florencio Varela, Buenos Aires province, on 23-24 July 2012.

The workshop was attended by neighborhood promoters, psychologists, outreach workers, recreational center workers, cooks and members of the community centers Angelelli, Caritas and Centro Arcángel Gabriel, from different areas of the province of Buenos Aires.

Over two days, social representations on drugs were reviewed, harm reduction strategies and the importance of networking were analyzed (with the idea of improving the institution networks, and contemplate the networks of young people). In addition, proposals of approach were developed in each community center, for consideration within each institution.

Strategies for approaching the drug problem - Reports from an Intercambios/IERP workshop

The Cannabis Social Clubs at the cross-roads

The last few years have witnessed a boom in new cannabis user associations in Spain. Although there are no reliable figures for them, most are known to have been created for the collective cultivation of marihuana crops, and are now several hundred-strong. They are mainly found in Catalonia, which is also home to the largest of them: some have existed for only a short time but already have several thousand members.

Two kinds of cannabis clubs are developing in this community and it is here that the difference between them can most clearly be seen. At least on paper, both models adopt the same legal structure and maintain that they have similar aims. But such similarities in form cannot conceal profound differences in function, to the extent that they are now described as Cannabis Commercial Clubs, as against Cannabis Social Clubs.

The rise in cannabis clubs of all kinds, with well-known initiatives like the currently frustrated plantation in Rasquera (in Tarragona), has forced the hand of Catalonia’s autonomous government. It has announced that it will set up a commission to debate the regulation of the associations, following a similar move in the Basque Country. This has resulted in an active debate within the cannabis users associations, and also between them, as they bring different approaches to the debate.

The Catalonian authorities seem comfortable with the Cannabis Social Club model promoted by the Federation of Cannabis Users Associations (FAC), whose members are small associations which produce marihuana for their own use. However, the larger clubs are not federation members. These clubs, which could be generally described as “membership-only coffee-shops”, are gaining ground thanks to their high budgets and their links with part of the cannabis industry, and the Catalonian authorities might eventually incline towards a model that is large-scale but easier to keep an eye on: it is far cheaper to watch fifty large associations than five hundred small ones.

The FAC has opted to maintain the social club model, as the one that provides the best defence of users’ rights, democratic and transparent administration and risk reduction. Given the threat of the clubs’ becoming commercial and ending up as pseudo catering companies with a membership card, the focus is moving to a model which until very recently had barely been suggested, but which has demonstrated a number of virtues that have made it a point of reference for the question of fair and effective drug policies.

Although the expression “Spanish model” is now commonly used when referring to the Cannabis Social Clubs, the model is not based on any specific regulations, as Spain’s law on illegal drugs is unclear. In fact, the clubs grew gradually out of some of the principles gathered piecemeal from the Supreme Court’s position on “shared consumption”. This was not a ruling on cannabis, but mainly developed out of sentences given to groups of heroin and cocaine users who got together to buy from the black market and then shared the drug between them.

It is difficult to make cannabis cultivation fit into the ruling, since unlike heroin and cocaine, cannabis is not bought exclusively on the black market but is easy for people to grow by themselves, so has to be stored in amounts considered likely to be used for trafficking. In fact, any amount greater than the equivalent of a few days’ personal consumption is generally assumed to be intended for drug-dealing.

The FAC member associations have taken the principles of shared consumption, their own practical experience, relevant court rulings and consultations with various bodies and used the information to develop a working model which is democratic, functions as a cooperative, is self-policing, transparent and is open to public inspection: a model known as a cannabis social club.

The formula was not thought out beforehand however, but was developed to take advantage of legal loopholes. Early on, when the Catalonian association ARSEC decided to grow crops collectively for its members, the initiative was described as “the Catalonian breakthrough*“, suggesting that ARSEC was in some way opening the breach in the walls of prohibition. But it was not so much an attempt to establish a predefined model as to see how far the current legal framework would stretch, given the difficulties involved in amending drug treaties.

The CSCs have developed through trying to fill the gaps in the law, but it is not clear what leeway these provide. The precedent on shared consumption establishes a series of conditions if the activity is not to be considered an offence: the people involved must be individuals, be part of a closed circuit and be regular consumers, none may make a profit from the activity and the amounts distributed must be for almost immediate use.

Clearly these conditions do not clear up all doubts. How many people can be in the closed circuit, since the point is to avoid the indiscriminate distribution of the drug? This is one of the issues to be thought out, but clearly a private group cannot expand indefinitely. The vast size of some of the clubs created in recent years give rise to reasonable doubt. Can a circuit with 10,000 active members be really closed?

What is clear is that current Spanish law does not allow any commercial cannabis distribution system open to the general public. So opening a Dutch-style coffee shop in Spain would be a crime. With that option out of the question, the anti-prohibition movement concentrated on developing a non-commercial system to be more compatible with the interests and needs of cannabis users. If it had not had to deal with these constraints, the movement for making marijuana use a normal activity would have started with the business sectors and not the activisits, and the model would undoubtedly have been very different and in the opinion of the FAC, far less satisfactory for the individual consumer.

From the creation of the first CSC back in 2001, it has been clear that this model perfectly covers members’ consumption needs, providing them with quality-assured cannabis, at reasonable prices and not acquired from the black market shaped by prohibition. There are other models which could give the same guarantees, but the ten years’ of practical experience demonstrate that the very fact that this is not a commercial model offers a series of further advantages, especially the management of the risks associated with consumption.

For a start, the absence of a profit motive reduces the risk of promoting the crop for commercial purposes. The fact that a CSC is a closed circle and can only be joined through an invitation from a member means that there is no point in advertising the club. Members develop links which are not usually found among clients of a commercial enterprise, particularly if they are occasional customers. In various associations the members evidently feel a sense of community which encourages them to take care of each other and share information with their peers, which helps reduce risks.

As the collective is small and members know and trust each other and there is a detailed register of each member’s use, it is easier to detect questionable consumption. If a member is suspected of being troublesome as a result of using cannabis, the club members talk to the person involved to bring to his or her attention the changes they have seen in behaviour and consumption patterns and apply a protocol. The clubs in the Basque country bring in a specialist in drug dependence hired to deal with the problem and who treats the person free of charge if he or she wishes. No coffee shop, bar, or tobacco shop offers similar services.

Spanish law governing associations stipulates that the members’ general assembly is the highest decision-taking body. Each member becomes part of the assembly on joining the association. The board of directors has to submit a balance of accounts and management to the assembly every year and members must vote to approve it. This ensures a level of transparency and gives members a degree of influence which would be impossible in a commercial society in which they would be no more than clients. And the larger the company involved in the production and distribution, the harder it is to audit the substance and the risks entailed, something only too obvious in the tobacco industry.

The Basque branch of the FAC, (EUSFAC), asked two prestigious university professors of criminal law to give a legal ruling on the issue. Both of them (Juan Muñoz, who wrote the previous report in 2001, and José Luis Díez Ripollés) teach at MalagaUniversity. The report, which has not yet been published, refers to the Cannabis Social Clubs as forms of “self organisation of consumption” which are neither crimes nor an administrative offence provided that they adhere to certain limits explained above.

The report makes it clear that current legislation makes no specific reference to cannabis distribution which is not through the democratic and participatory organisation of the users themselves. Unless the criminal code and the interpretation of it changes, Spain has no place for commercial enterprises, like some of the larger “clubs”, however they may try to hide behind the facade of an association.

Díez Ripollés and Muñoz have proposed a specific legal formula for the CSC: the creation of producer and consumer cooperative societies, in the terms of Law 27/1999 (the Cooperatives Act). Such cooperatives will be non-profit and will have regular members, employee members and associate members. The cannabis must be supplied from the legal market and as far as possible the club must encourage its members to consume it responsibly. The FAC clearly opts for this kind of democratic and non-profit formula, balancing producers’ and consumers’ interests and rights, rather than other types of organisation which give priority to the financial interests of a minority who distribute what others produce with generally little concern for the final impact of their merchandise. There are already many products subjected to the so-called “markets” and the disastrous consequences of organising people’s lives in terms of business and profits become clearer every day. May cannabis be spared that fate.

Between collective organisation and commercialisation

August 12 is proclaimed the International Day of Youth. To mark this day, we, Students for Sensible Drug Policy (SSDP), Youth RISE and Espolea take this opportunity to call on Member States to 

remove criminal sanctions placed on young people who use drugs. 

Harsh drug laws are often established and justified to protect youth, however young people are disproportionately affected by the war on drugs which has resulted in widespread and far reaching harms:

Criminal sanctions against young people who use drugs have consistently failed in its mission to deter drug use and has instead led to often higher consumption rates and high levels of youth incarceration;

Young people who use drugs hide their consumption when harsh policies exist, significantly increasing their risk of HIV, Hepatitis C and overdose;

Arrest, incarceration, and criminal records damage the future opportunities of young people and present life-long barriers to education and employment opportunities;

The criminalization of young people who use drugs also leads to widespread human rights violations, including arbitrary detention, forced treatment and denial of life-saving health services.

Member States must decriminalize drug use, drug possession for personal use, and seek alternatives to incarceration for the best interests of young people globally. As the world, and in particular the United Nations, turns to the next generation for the solutions for today's problems, we also call on the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to support Member States to move towards decriminalization and explore alternative policy responses for young people who use drugs. Punitive laws have been shown not to protect us as young people, but rather to adversely affect our health, violate our human rights and inhibit our future opportunities.

We call on you today to support, don’t punish our youth. We deserve a better future and a better today.

Youth RISE, SSDP and Espolea call to decriminalise youth on International Youth Day

Liberal senators Ricardo Lagos Weber and Fulvio Rossi officially proposed a piece of legislation to Chile’s National Congress on Wednesday that would decriminalize the cultivation of marijuana for personal and therapeutic use. The bill comes in the middle of a renewed debate in Chile over the legality of marijuana and two weeks after Rossi publicly stated that he personally consumed marijuana.

“It is important to understand that when you permit personal cultivation you are attacking illegal purchase and narcotrafficking,” Rossi said.

“Some have said that to approve a bill like this will make narcotraffickers very happy, and I tell them the opposite: ‘We are reducing their revenue,’” he added. “Specialists in these issues have said that the only way to hit organized crime and narcoterrorism where it hurts is from an economic standpoint.”

The bill’s introduction has already been met with heavy criticism from conservative politicians, such as Sen. Jaime Orpis from the far-right Independent Democratic Union Party (UDI), who said marijuana was a gateway drug.

“Objectively, we are dealing with a drug that causes a lot of damage,” Orpis said. “The big problem in Chile is the consumption not only of marijuana, but rather a series of drugs, with marijuana being a case of particular concern.”

Rossi, however, rejected the association of marijuana with other drugs.

“There is nothing that shows that it is a gateway for other drugs,” he said. “I would say the consumption of alcohol is more of a gateway to the destruction of lives than marijuana.”

The bill does not specify the exact quantity of marijuana that would qualify for legal possession, which will be determined during its debate in Congress.

The bill further suggests moving marijuana policy out of the Interior Ministry’s jurisdiction and instead handing the matter over to the Health Ministry so that it can be treated as a health issue rather than a law enforcement issue.

Chilean senators propose decriminalizing cultivation of marijuana

Drug laws established to protect youth too often present the greatest danger to young people, who suffer imprisonment, harassment and marginalization. The emerging discourse on drug policy reform needs to incorporate the experiences of young people who use drugs – because, for too long, the rhetoric has not reflected their reality.

In the Middle East, Central Asia, Southeast Asia and Africa, Youth RISE continues to see too many young people who use drugs stigmatized and isolated. They experience severe human rights abuses, a lack of health services and appropriate treatment, in addition to being barred from education and employment.

In Nigeria, young people who use drugs are increasingly at risk of what appears to be a growing HIV epidemic among young users. This is driven by high-risk drug using behavior, a consequence of drug polices based on criminalization and subsequent persecution and social stigma. Research by Youth RISE our members in Nepal has shown the major barriers young people experience in accessing drug and HIV prevention services. Unjust harassment and persecution by police officials is also commonly experienced in Lebanon. Here, Youth RISE members have facilitated workshops at a women's prison, where treatment for these young women’s dependencies is non-existent and sexual abuse is common. Similar themes have been found in Kyrgyzstan where a partner organization of Youth RISE interviewed 30 young women who use drugs. These women reported widespread sexual abuse by law enforcement officials and a lack of access to appropriate health services.

Punitive policies are often justified as necessary for the protection of young people. However, the logic that these policies deter young people from using drugs is clearly false and is not supported by academic evidence or by what we see on the ground. It is well documented that harsh penalties for drug offences compromise public health and increase the risk of drug related harms including HIV transmission by driving drug use underground into risky environments.

However, for the majority of young people who use illegal substances (many for only brief periods in their lives), the biggest hindrance to them fulfilling their potential is the impact of drug convictions, cautions and criminal records. In countries around the world, criminal charges for drug offences based on the possession of small amounts of substances result in young people being denied a proper education through, for example, school expulsion or denial of financial aid. The barriers they experience to education continue into their adult years where the same obstacles to gaining meaningful and long term employment exist.

We hope by raising the voices of young people, we can advance change in how drug issues are addressed, especially among the younger generation who will be integral to future policy formulation. Young people remain a population at risk, and they need to be given the opportunity to fulfill their potential. Humanism, pragmatism and the protection of the health and development of our youth must guide drug policy formulation. This requires support, not punishment.

National governments to remove criminal sanctions for possessing drugs for personal use. Drugs must be prioritized as a public health issue rather than a law enforcement one, prioritizing the health, human rights and life chances of young people who use drugs.

International institutions to support countries to move towards decriminalization and assist them in adopting public health based approaches for addressing young people who use drugs.

Civil society organizations and NGO’s who support human rights and youth development to support the call for the decriminalization of young people who use drugs.

Young people to be active in making their voices heard in this campaign and participate in drug policy reform.

Support, don’t punish: Our youth

The Iranian authorities must urgently overturn the death sentence for a shop worker who was tried unfairly on drugs-related charges, Amnesty International said, amid fears his execution is imminent.

On 1 August, Saeed Sedeghi was transferred from Tehran’s Kahrizak detention centre to Ghezel Hesar Prison in Karaj, 50 km west of the capital.

The transfer came just days after he was brought before Tehran’s Revolutionary Court – without having a lawyer present – and made to sign a document informing him that his death sentence would be implemented.

“By transferring Saeed Sedeghi so soon after informing him of the intent to carry out his death sentence, we fear the Iranian authorities are gearing up to execute him,” said Ann Harrison, Deputy Middle East and North Africa Programme Director at Amnesty International.

“His death sentence should be overturned immediately and he should be retried in full accordance with international fair trial standards, without recourse to the death penalty.”

Before his transfer from the capital, Sedeghi had applied to Iran’s Amnesty and Clemency Commission for a pardon, but never received a response about the outcome.

On 2 June 2012, the Revolutionary Court had sentenced him to death for purchasing – along with three other men – and possessing 512 kg of methamphetamine (“crystal meth”).

In addition to execution, the court handed Sedeghi a fine of 2 million rials (approximately US$163) and sentenced him to 20 lashes for individual possession of 21 grams of opium and marijuana.

The convictions came after the shop worker underwent an unfair trial in which he had no contact with his state-appointed lawyer before appearing in court.

He told his family he was tortured and otherwise ill-treated while at Kahrizak detention centre – including having several teeth knocked out by officials there.

The Kahrizak detention centre was reportedly closed in 2009 on the order of the Supreme Leader following allegations of torture which led to several deaths in custody.

Subsequently, a new facility is reported to have been opened there under another name – Soroush 111 – though locals in Iran continue to refer to the facility as Kahrizak.

The vast majority of executions in Iran in recent years have been for drug-related offences, despite there being no clear evidence that the death penalty serves as an effective deterrent against such offences – the country has one of the highest rates of drug addiction in world.

Under Iran’s Anti-Narcotics Law, the death penalty is mandatory in cases of possession or trafficking of more than a specified amount of various drugs. In December 2010, the law’s scope was expanded to include a wider range of illegal drugs, among them methamphetamine.

Under Article 32 of the law, death sentences handed down by lower courts are subject to confirmation either by the head of the Supreme Court or the Prosecutor General and it appears that those sentenced to death are not granted leave to appeal, in contravention of Iranian and international law.

Iran is second only to China in terms of the volume of death sentences carried out annually, with many of the more than 600 executions believed to have taken place in 2011 carried out behind a cloak of secrecy.

By the third week of July 2012, the Iranian authorities are believed to have executed at least 272 people, including 98 executions that have not been announced by the authorities. More than 65 per cent of all executions this year have involved drug trafficking.

International standards prohibit the use of the death penalty except for “crimes with an intention to kill which resulted in the loss of life”, and the UN Human Rights Committee has on numerous occasions found that drug-related offences do not meet this criterion.

“Drug-related offences like those of which Saeed Sedeghi was convicted do not meet the ‘most-serious crimes’ threshold prescribed for the use of the death penalty,” said Ann Harrison.

“We urge the Iranian authorities to urgently review the Anti-Narcotics law to remove the death penalty as a possible punishment, and to commute the death sentences of all prisoners currently on death row.”

Amnesty International opposes the death penalty in all cases as the ultimate cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment, in violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Iran: Overturn death sentence for drugs offence

Increasing rates of HIV testing or expanding the use of antiretroviral therapy will not be enough to eliminate new HIV transmissions in China, according to a mathematical model published in the online edition of 

However, a “combination prevention” approach including an expansion of testing, targeted harm reduction programmes and wider use of HIV therapy was shown to have a potentially significant impact on the course of the epidemic in China.

“This is the first study to consider the cost-effectiveness of treatment, testing, harm reduction and combinations of these strategies at a national level in China,” write the authors. “Research to date has only considered the strategies in isolation and only in certain provinces and cities.”

At the end of 2009 there were an estimated 48,000 new HIV infections in China and the total number of infections in the country is thought to be in the region of 740,000.

The epidemic is concentrated in specific provinces (Yunnan, Guangxi, Guandong, Xinjiang and Henan) and focused on certain high-risk groups (injecting drug users, female sex workers and men who have sex with men).

A national government-led strategy advocates a comprehensive package of prevention, treatment and support as a way of controlling the epidemic. Nevertheless, the rate of testing among high-risk groups is generally low; there is limited access to harm reduction services such as needle exchange; and only a quarter of eligible patients are receiving antiretroviral therapy.

Given this situation, investigators wanted to gain a better understanding of the potential course of the HIV epidemic in China. They also wished to determine which of four prevention strategies would avert the greatest number of new infections and be most cost effective. The strategies were:

Expanded voluntary couselling and testing (VCT).

Expanded antiretroviral therapy: coverage of HIV treatment is increased to 50% of those eligible (CD4 cell count below 350 cells/mm3).

Expanded harm reduction programmes: expanded to reach entire populations of injecting drug users.

Combination strategies: a combination of any two or more of the above.

Cost-effectiveness was measured by calculating incremental quality-adjusted life years (QALYS) per life year gained.

The model predicted the course of the epidemic over 30 years.

The investigators’ calculations showed that without any new interventions, by 2040 the cumulative number of HIV infections in China would be 3.41 million. Three-quarters of these infections would be in high-risk groups. An estimated 25% of all injecting drug users would be HIV positive, whereas prevalence in men who have sex with men would reach 14%.

A VCT-only strategy, which involved annual HIV tests for high-risk individuals and one-off screening in lower-risk groups would avert an estimated 7% of all new infections at a cost of $5810 per QALY.

Expanding treatment would prevent an estimated 340,000 infections at a cost of $4840 per QALY. A targeted harm-reduction programme would prevent 710,000 infections, costing $5010 per QALY.

“Biomedical interventions, such as VCT and treatment, can have a significant impact on HIV and are cost effective under certain implementation strategies,” comment the authors. However, they caution that, on their own, these interventions will not be able to eliminate HIV transmissions.

Combination prevention approaches were shown to have a bigger potential impact on the epidemic.

A combination of any two interventions would avert between 17 and 29% of new infections at a cost of between $5030 and $5310 per QALY. A combination of all three interventions – testing, treatment and harm reduction – was shown to avert 1.2 million new infections at an estimated cost of $5550 per QALY.

The investigators repeated their calculations to take account of the marginalisation of drug users and men who have sex with men in China. They believed that this would potentially make these high-risk groups harder to reach.

However, they showed that the combined use of all three methods of prevention could avert between 21 and 43% of projected infections over the next 30 years.

“This study shows that it may be possible to significantly control HIV growth amongst high-risk populations in China through a combination of VCT, treatment and harm reduction programmes,” conclude the authors. “These raise the possibility that China will face a future largely free of this disease if it acts now to implement a widespread expansion of both biomedical and harm reduction strategies.”

Combination prevention approach could have a big impact on HIV epidemic in China

The UN Office of Drug Control (UNODC) has thoroughly documented the violence, crime, and corruption linked with the worldwide heroin and opium trade. The U.S. news media report every day on the mayhem and corruption of government officials caused by the drug wars in Mexico, Colombia, and other points south of our border. In Afghanistan, the Taliban tax the opium trade and protect poppy farmers from eradication, fueling the insurgency and our 11-year war.

However, these problems are all consequences of drug prohibition, not of the drugs themselves. In legal terms, drugs are 

 (wrong because prohibited by law) rather than 

(inherently wrong, such as theft or murder). During the U.S. experiment with Prohibition (1920-1933), alcohol was 

; as soon as it was legalized, it again became a normal regulated, traded, and taxed consumer product.

We need to rethink our prohibition of drugs. What problem are we trying to solve by making drugs illegal? Have we chosen the most effective and affordable solution? Are the collateral consequences worth it?We should start with the premise that neither demand for drugs nor the drugs themselves can be eliminated. UNODC estimates the ultimate street value of drugs originating in southern Afghanistan, primarily Helmand and Kandahar, as $68 

. Where there is demand, there will be supply. If Afghan supplies were reduced, production would simply move elsewhere—as it did when it moved into Afghanistan in the 1980s after being pushed out of Southeast Asia’s Golden Triangle.

The American experience of Prohibition is instructive.

The U.S. ban on alcohol served primarily to corrupt public officials and endanger the public. Supplying the unabated demand for alcohol required traffickers to pay bribes to police and politicians. As prices increased as a result, cutting quality was one way to keep the retail price down, which resulted in deaths from adulterated products. Moreover, the rise of violent, organized crime during this period—required to move the product and handle disputes within the trade—created criminal organizations that endure to this day.

The Prohibition experiment was relatively short-lived. Part of the impetus for repeal was that Prohibition was not having the intended effect of cutting either alcohol use or the social problems resulting from its abuse (the potential for alcohol tax revenues in the midst of the Great Depression was another factor). Whatever successes the experiment had were outweighed by the costs in corruption and violence, not to mention widespread public cynicism and hypocrisy.

Most importantly, the substantial and unanticipated costs of Prohibition were borne almost entirely by the United States. It was our own police and elected officials who were corrupted. It was our own cities afflicted by the criminal patronage networks battling over turf. We never attempted to force other countries to make the trade in alcohol illegal or participate in our war on alcohol.

The day after Prohibition was repealed, beer distributors no longer had to turn to the Mafia for enforcement of their franchise agreements. They took their disputes to court. The collateral violence largely stopped, and corrupt politicians and police suddenly lost a source of income. Product quality could be standardized. States could make individual decisions about regulating and taxing alcohol.

Of course, the social problems—particularly family violence—that were the ostensible reason for Prohibition continued, as they do to this day. My own experience as a prosecutor in Domestic Violence Court in Chicago in the 1980s is illustrative. If it hadn’t been for alcohol-related crimes, the court could have been closed. Alcohol had adverse effects on families that many other drugs did not have.

But by 1933, we had come to the realization that prohibition was an ineffective way to address abuse and indeed sidelined attempts to address alcoholism and family violence. There is still no simple solution to these problems, but we understood then that any response must directly address the problem. We as a society have come to terms withthe inescapable downsides of a product that the public insists on having but that is subject to abuse. We have struck a balance since realizing that criminalizing the trade in alcohol only made everything worse.

Federal statute criminalized narcotics beginning in 1914. There was no nationwide public advocacy campaign as there was leading up to Prohibition. Legislation seems to have been driven primarily by racial fears—of “cocaine-crazed Negroes” raping white women and “Chinamen” in California both using opium and seducing white women into becoming opium addicts. Perhaps there was political value in coming out against the evil of drug use by disfavored groups when it seemed costless to do so.

But we now know a great deal about the worldwide costs in violence, crime, and corruption of making drugs illegal. If the downsides of our drug policy are now so clear, why haven’t drugs (opium and heroin as well as marijuana) been legalized? Why is the calculation different from that made 

After spending more than four years in Afghanistan and seeing first-hand the impact of our drug policies—consequences most Americans never see—I have come to the conclusion that we persist on this course primarily because the costs of our drug policies are borne by other countries, not by us. In contrast with our experience under Prohibition, the corruption of American police and politicians by the drug trade is a relatively minor problem. Demand within the United States is just not high enough to necessitate much bribery.

The serious corruption is instead all on the production end, and this we have succeeded in outsourcing to foreign countries. Our war on drugs is fought on the territories of countries such as Colombia, Honduras, and Mexico. The headless bodies in Mexico barely make the inside pages of American newspapers (imagine if dozens of mutilated bodies were dumped in suburban Maryland). We have requisitioned foreign turf for our war on drugs.Citizens of these countries have no voice in the matter. Their leaders’ acquiescence to U.S. policies undercuts electoral accountability, and corruption of their police and courts undermines the rule of law. We have compromised democracy in our own hemisphere.

In Afghanistan, we have failed to connect the dots between drugs and corruption. At the July 2012 donors’ conference in Tokyo, donor after donor urged President Karzai to combat corruption. However, as long as we insist on the illegality of poppy, we are making a demand that cannot possibly be met.

A country that supplies 80-90 percent of the world’s demand for poppy products must necessarily be corrupt. To move the heroin, opium, and marijuana from field to market, officials and police can demand payment to look the other way (or engage in the trade themselves). The import of chemicals for processing requires the cooperation of customs and border police. Even the poppy eradication process itself has been corrupted, as officials target the fields of rivals while protecting their own. And any eradication in one area inevitably pushes production to another, simply pushing a bubble around in a balloon.

Afghan citizens are well aware of the suitcases full of dollars that leave Kabul Airport every day for Dubai. While kickbacks from development and military contracts are undoubtedly involved, drug profits in particular have to be moved out of the country. In Helmand Province, district chief of police positions are reportedly purchased for sums as high as $150,000 (and that is only the initial payment, not the yearly “rent”), and the chief expects to recoup his investment. District governors, appointed by the president, are merely shifted in musical-chairs fashion around the province when citizens or the U.S. military complains about corruption.

The Karzai government has also chosen not to implement those provisions of the 2004 Afghan constitution that call for the election of mayors and district and city councils. Instead, these councils do not exist, and all local officials report to the president. One can only imagine that all these officials are in place for a reason. For example, the mayor of Kandahar, a city of 800,000, is a presidential appointee, not answerable to local citizens. As a result, prior to his assassination in 2011, the president’s brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, had a free hand in managing affairs in Kandahar province. As in Latin America, democratic accountability is the loser. The money at stake is so overwhelming that honest and accountable government cannot be implemented without changing the drug nexus. The incentives are just too strong.

If opium and heroin (as well as marijuana) were legalized, what would happen? Corrupt Afghan officials would suddenly lose a source of income, as poppy is illegal in Afghanistan primarily at U.S. insistence. The Taliban would be unable to extract protection money from farmers, or tax the drug trade. The war might wind down to a speedy conclusion, and Afghanistan could fund its own development and security forces out of sales of a legal commodity. Latin American democracy too would undoubtedly be strengthened and violence would decrease.

The U.S. government could save all the money it now spends on the DEA, interdiction, and drug prosecutions. States could make their own decisions about drugs. Local police and sheriffs could quit chasing after pot growers (who could now standardize and advertise product quality and potency), and devote scarce public safety budgets to the crimes that the average citizen prioritizes. State prisons that are overwhelmed with drug offenders could downsize. Of course, the entire anti-drug enterprise of U.S. officials and government contractors, greased by U.S. security assistance to drug producer nations, would drastically downsize too—and so the anti-drug lobby seeking to preserve its livelihood would undoubtedly be a political force in opposition. Likewise the manufacturers of medicinal morphine who have a monopoly on licensed poppy from India.

On the demand side of the equation, prices might well drop as the costs of paying protection were eliminated. It’s possible that usage would increase, but users don’t seem to have much difficulty obtaining supplies right now. With all the resources freed from fighting an unwinnable war against drugs, we could attend to the social problems that facilitate certain kinds of drug use (heroin use being primarily a lower-class phenomenon) and result from substance abuse. There are many options to explore once the problem is defined honestly and resources are available for experimentation.

Even if the middle class doesn’t care what happens to the lower class, the costs of prosecution and incarceration are a direct drain on the public purse, and an indirect drain as imprisonment itself causes family disruption and disintegration. Under a legalization regime, we would no longer have so many poorly educated young men with drug convictions rendered ineligible for future legitimate employment. Curtailed voting rights for those with felony convictions also means that individuals affected by drug laws have had no voice in changing them—a fundamental requirement of a democracy. Citizens in the 1930s could vote their interest in repealing Prohibition. These rights must be restored.

The immediate response to potential drug legalization is usually, “Why do you want our children hooked on drugs?!” (The rationales of 1914 are no longer mentioned.) Remember, however, that those campaigning for repeal of Prohibition did not say, “We’re in favor of alcohol-induced family violence.” Or, “Let’s have more alcohol-related carnage on the highways.” People were quite aware of the problems—which continued during Prohibition as before and since. We as a society concluded in 1933, however, that prohibition was an ineffective way of dealing with this particular societal ill, and that illegality created second- and third-order effects that were far worse than the evil that Prohibition was supposed to address.

As with alcohol, we need to be honest with ourselves about the costs and benefits of our social policies and recognize that not all problems have comprehensive or entirely satisfactory solutions. We can only do our best to make decisions that take into consideration all of the costs and benefits of our choices and not pretend that moral crusades are costless. We need to address honestly the morality of foisting upon other countries the violence, corruption, and damage to democracy caused by U.S. drug policies and driven by U.S. demand.

Legalization is the only solution to the problem of Afghan and Latin American violence and corruption—and the less obvious but more insidious problems of poverty, over-incarceration, and the misallocation of public resources within the United States. Only legalization can change the worldwide nexus of drugs and criminality.

On drugs and democracy

Activists at the International AIDS Conference disrupt a session sponsored by the pharmaceutical giant, Roche - why did they take action? Watch the HCLU's movie and learn more!

Hepatitis C has been dubbed "the silent epidemic” – because the infection can remain unnoticed for several years or even decades after transmission of the virus, and also because this epidemic has received much less public attention than HIV. Hepatitis C is much more infectious than HIV and in the majority of cases leads to potentially-fatal liver cirrhosis. Approximately 2 million people are infected with Hepatitis C every year, many of them belong to marginalized groups such as injecting drug users. The treatment for Hep C (pegylated interferon) is marketed by big pharmaceutical companies (Merck and Roche) and costs thousands of dollars for a few weeks. As a result, access to treatment in transitional and developing countries is very low. Activists at the International AIDS Conference disrupted a seminar sponsored by Roche to protest the high prices and "Big Pharma’s greed”. HCLU’s video advocacy team filmed the action and asked participants to explain their cause.

Pharma greed kills

The use of an AR-15-type rifle in the tragedy in Colorado has caused many to question whether it makes sense to allow the purchase of military-style assault rifles. What a lot of people don’t know is that these rifles are also the weapons of choice among ruthless Mexican drug cartels. In the last 5 years, nearly 60,000 people have lost their lives in Mexico’s wave of violence.

The brutal truth is this: 70 percent of the AR-15s and other guns used by drug lords, gangs, and kidnappers in Mexico, come from the United States.

WOLA has partnered with Cuéntame, an online community of Latino activists, to produce a short video showing how these guns are trafficked to Mexico, who profits from their sale, and what President Obama can do to stop this kind of trafficking.

Join Mexico’s peace movement and our coalition* by signing the petition at the end of the video asking President Obama to act now.

U.S. guns: The awful, shocking truth

It is a challenge to wean farmers off opium poppy cultivation in Lao People's Democratic Republic, once part of the Golden Triangle of South-East Asia. Without meaningful employment, subsistence farmers fall back on the lucrative cash crop to support themselves and their families.

As recently as 1998, Lao PDR was the third-largest illicit opium poppy producer in the world and had one of the highest opium addiction rates. From 1998 to 2005, opium poppy cultivation in the country was reduced by 93 per cent and opium addiction by 68 per cent, thanks to the Government's strong commitment.

In 2005, it became illegal to cultivate opium poppy in the country, and while this was a move to reduce the production of opium, it left many farmers without the means to make a living. Without an alternative source of income, many of these farmers were at high risk of reverting to opium poppy cultivation.

Although Lao PDR had significantly eliminated opium poppy cultivation by 2007, the country has seen a recent resurgence in opium poppy cultivation, endangering the progress made. From 2008 to 2011, the area under cultivation more than doubled, now amounting 4,100 ha.

To help farmers pursue alternative sustainable livelihoods projects as opposed to opium poppy cultivation, UNODC is working in six South Asia countries, including Lao, PDR.

In Lao PDR, farmers in the Oudomxay province with the support of UNODC have benefited from an alternative development project that supports the implementation of improved production technology. Farmers have been supported to develop greenhouse technology and small irrigation systems, and received training on cultivation techniques, such as producing and high-yield and disease-resistant seeds. Since the project commenced, farmers' incomes from the sale of produce such as peaches and organic vegetables have increased tenfold.

Encouragingly, areas where sustainable alternative development has been provided, such as Oudomxay Province, have not experienced an increase in opium poppy cultivation.

The project in Oudomxay Province takes a holistic approach and has been designed to increase the production of legal crops, create income generating activities, develop small farmer associations and cooperatives and prevent opium production and consumption. Special attention is given to increasing women's participation in project activities.

By addressing food insecurity, the project in Lao PDR will assist the government in long-term efforts to reach the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) on poverty eradication and hunger, while at the same time helping the country achieve the MDG targets for gender equality and environmental sustainability.

An important component is promoting south-south cooperation for development. The project, funded by the German Government, is being implemented in partnership with the Thai Royal Project Foundation and the Highland Research Development Institute of Thailand (HRDI), which has more than 40 years of agricultural experience in working with ethnic hill tribes and with highland crops.

In March, UNODC and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) stepped up efforts to promote grass-roots development in poor rural communities dependent on the cultivation of illicit drug crops. Since 2007, the two agencies have been working on projects to help rehabilitate opium addicts and involve them in income-generating activities; provide social services and basic infrastructure; and improve market access for products.

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