A basic legislation proposal for introducing a regulated cannabis market in Czechia should be finished by the end of March, the country’s National Drug Coordinator Jindřich Vobořil said on Friday after a meeting of experts.

The proposal should lay the foundations for the rules of handing licenses to producers, distributors and sellers, as well as to the formation of so-called cannabis clubs and the cultivation of cannabis.

Czech Republic: Basic legislation proposal on legalizing cannabis should be ready by March 2023

According to the World Health Organization, more than half of the people who use drugs in Kenya are 10-19 years of age.

The drug-related cases that have been heard and concluded by the courts rose by 44 per cent from 2016 to 2018.

This is why we need to advocate evidence-based legislation and public health methods that are effective in combatting drug abuse in Kenya.

Drug use is a growing problem in Kenya. Young people are now more exposed to substances such as heroin, cocaine and marijuana aka bhang aka shash than ever before.

The law on narcotics ignores the connection between public health and drug use and instead implements punitive measures which have no history of effectiveness.

Updates in the law seem to target people of lower economic status by increasing fines, in some cases more than 20 times. This puts low-income individuals in jail at disproportionate rates.

These harsh measures should be replaced by interventions that humanise people who use drugs and offer treatment, which prisons do not have the capacity to provide.

Kenya: Review policy to address the youth drug addiction

 is embedded in the human experience – both now and historically – yet it's arguably one of the most socially controversial human habits. In the UK, controlling drug use has become a key policy issue for every government since the 1960s. 

However, there is a growing consensus that the current approach has failed, with the Home Office's 

 evidence demonstrating intense criminalisation of drug use and a crackdown on those that grow or distribute drugs is not reducing drug use nor addressing the harms that the criminal market creates. In fact, it is making things worse. 

That is why we’re incredibly concerned by the Home Secretary’s previous comments on drugs. Not only has Suella Braverman continued her predecessor’s vendetta against “middle-class” recreational drug users, but she has apparently also gone further by supporting the reclassification of cannabis from a class B to a class A drug (via 

 itself from these reports, it's still concerning that the laws around drug use in the UK show little sign of reform. 

Here, we explain why the UK's criminalisation of drug use will most likely increase harm for those already stigmatised within society, including women who are particularly vulnerable to tough drug policies.

'Women use drugs too': Why reforming our drug laws will reduce harm for *all* of us

Harm Reduction International and the European Saudi Organisation for Human Rights, together with 34 co-signing organisations, urge the United Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) to take all possible steps to halt the spate of drug-related executions witnessed in Saudi Arabia since 10 November 2022; against official commitments and international standards.

Since January 2020, Saudi Arabia had halted executions for drug-related offences, and in January 2021 the head of the official Human Rights Commission, Awwad Al-Awwad, had announced their suspension, deeming it intended to “give a second chance” to individuals not facing charges for violent crimes.

On November 10, 2022, Saudi Arabia suddenly and without warning resumed executions for drug-related crimes, and as of November 24, 2022, it announced 20 executions for drug crimes. According to data published by the Saudi Ministry of Interior, the victims are all men, and of the following nationalities: 8 of Saudi, 5 of Syrian, 3 of Pakistani, 2 of Nigerian, and 2 of Jordanian nationality.

The Saudi government’s handling of the death penalty is shrouded in secrecy, as the Kingdom does not publish the number of individuals facing punishment, their names, or their legal status. Despite this, tracking by ESOHR confirms that dozens of detainees are currently on death row for drug offenses, with foreign nationals (including migrant workers) and individuals from vulnerable socioeconomic backgrounds overrepresented. All of them are now to be considered at imminent risk of execution. Among them is Jordanian citizen, Hussein Abu Al-Kheir, who was arbitrarily detained, sentenced to death, and is now facing imminent execution after being told he was being moved to a ‘death cell’, where his execution can be carried out without any prior warning. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) found that there is no legal basis for Mr Al-Kheir’s detention, and concluded that his death sentence should be overturned and he should be released immediately.

Monitoring by ESOHR confirms the lack of basic standards for a fair trial in capital drug cases. In addition to being subjected to torture and ill-treatment, defendants are deprived of their most basic rights, including the right to adequate legal defense, and the right to an interpreter when needed.

While at the international level 146 states including 20 members of the Organisation of the Islamic cooperation (on 57 member states) have abolished the death penalty or observe a moratorium, Saudi Arabia remains one of the top executioners in the world.

Saudi Arabia’s sudden decision to resume executions for drug crimes is a very disturbing indicator, and risks leading to an unprecedented surge in executions in the country. This is particularly troubling, considering that 147 sentences have been implemented since the beginning of 2022.

Such resumption is in official disregard of the promises previously made by high level officials, as well as international standards. Regarding the former, in addition to the Human Rights Commission’s announcement, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman repeatedly declared that there is an official effort to limit the use of this form of punishment; most recently in March 2022, when he claimed that the death penalty “has become limited to cases in which one person kills another. ” On the latter, we reiterate that drug offences do not meet the threshold of ‘most serious’ crimes to which the death penalty must be restricted pursuant to international standards; and that the death penalty for drug offences also contradicts international drug control law, as indicated by UNODC and the INCB.

On 22 November, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights urged the Saudi Government to halt Al-Kheir’s reported imminent execution, and called on “the Saudi authorities to adopt a formal moratorium on executions for drug-related offenses, to commute death sentences for drug-related offenses, and to ensure the right to a fair trial for all defendants, including those charged with such offenses, in line with its international obligations.”

Urgently and publicly denounce the 20 executions for drug offences reported since November 10, 2022;

Call on Saudi Arabia to abide by its own commitment to halt executions for drug crimes;

Engage with Saudi authorities with an eye to receiving a commitment to reinstate a moratorium on all pending executions for drug crimes and review the sentences of all individuals on death row for drug offences; and

Seek assurances that Mr Al-Kheir will not be executed and will be released immediately, in line with WGAD recommendations.

Abdorrahman Boroumand Centre on Human Rights in Iran

Correlation – European Harm Reduction Network

European Saudi Organisation for Human Rights (ESOHR)

International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC)

World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT)

Organisation for the Prevention of Intense Suffering (OPIS)

Women and Harm Reduction International Network (WHRIN)

World Coalition Against the Death Penalty

Halt executions for drug offences in Saudi Arabia - Open letter by civil society organisations

Editor’s Note: Christopher Hallam is an independent researcher working in academia and civil society organisations, and a Research Associate at the Global Drug Policy Observatory, Swansea University. He is also the author of ‘

White Drug Cultures and Regulation in London, 1916-1960

‘ (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). In this ‘Points’ interview we ask him about his book and then his broader research interests in the history and culture of illicit drugs and the regimes that have sought to control them.

Please tell readers a little bit about yourself.

Depending on the context, I usually introduce myself as either a marginal academic or an independent researcher. Either way, I possess a remarkable skill for conducting research that no-one is willing to fund. By discipline, I am a historian who emerged, intellectually speaking, out of the cultural studies debates of the late twentieth century. I like to use a mix of conceptual tools drawn from heterogeneous theoretical frameworks, and I study drugs primarily as cultural substances – symbolic things that people consume, talk about, try to control, fear and celebrate.

What got you interested in the history of alcohol, pharmacy, drugs, or pharmaceuticals?

I have personal experience of ‘addiction.’ I was a heroin smoker when ‘chasing the dragon’ arrived in the UK in the 1980s. I had been interested in drugs since I was a kid, when my father introduced me to Thomas de Quincey (not personally). I understood heroin use as a form of instinctive rebellion against Thatcherite neoliberalism. It wasn’t, but it did make it much more tolerable. Later, I did a degree in sociology, in which I was taught cultural studies by the wonderful Angela McRobbie. Reading Foucault and others, I began to see that everything was made of history, including drugs. We, all of us, walk in a ghosted landscape.

What motivated you to write this book specifically?

I am interested in youth cultures, and in what have been called the ‘countercultures of modernity,’ which include a broad array of movements from psychoanalysis to bohemia to hippies. During archival wanderings, I came across a batch of police and Home Office files on Brenda Dean Paul, who was the notorious/famous ‘society addict’ in late 1920s and 1930s London. I got these files opened under FOI legislation and saw immediately that they were significant. I approached the great Virginia Berridge, and soon I did a PhD under her supervision. This book was born of that research, though it explores considerably beyond Brenda Dean Paul and her set.

Notes on the emergence of drug cultures and regulation in 20th century London — Interview with Christopher Hallam

The disproportionate impact of incarceration on women creates a myriad of challenges that they are forced to overcome once they are released. Nora and Paulina, two formerly incarcerated women from Argentina, are prime examples of how motherhood adds a different layer of complexity to the survival strategies women need to develop both inside and outside of prison as a result of the failure and unwillingness of states to protect and uphold their rights.

After her parents separated, Nora began spending a lot of time on the streets in Argentina with others who engaged in drug use and gang activity. She became a single mom at the age of 16. After having had to take part in illicit activities to support herself and her daughter, she was detained and sentenced to 10 years in prison.

Six years after her release, Nora still remembers what it was like to give birth while being shackled, a practice disturbingly common across the Americas.

“Justice condemns women with a double sentence for being a woman… especially as a low-income woman, you’re invisible in the system until you commit a crime. Then, they finally see you,” she says.

When her son, Santiago, was born, she began writing letters to highlight what was happening to women and their children in the prison, as well as those left behind on the other side of the prison walls. She wrote about the conditions that women were subjected to with their children. Her accounts later became a part of the “Incarcerated Girls Network” on Facebook, a page that went viral and became a vital source of information and resources to denounce the government’s treatment of women and children in prison.

When Nora finally received the news that she would be released, Santiago was no longer with her. Children in Argentina can only stay with their mothers in prison until they are four years old. Her two older daughters, who were 21 and 16 when she was released, each had continued their lives without the presence of their mother. The realization that life had gone on without her, and that she no longer felt like she belonged, tainted this newfound sense of freedom. Nora’s difficulty in transitioning to a post-prison life without any support or resources from the government became another source of motivation to help other women in similar situations, including those under house arrest.

The organization Nora helped create and currently works with, La Rama de Liberadxs y Familiares, (the Branch of Liberated People and Family Members), works to support formerly incarcerated men and women in the province of Buenos Aires, as part of the Movimiento de Trabajadores Excluidos, (Movement of Excluded Workers, MTE). The MTE is an organization where thousands of men and women that are excluded from the traditional labor market come together to create employment opportunities. They also work to support women under house arrest, most of whom have little access to employment or basic resources despite the fact that they are the sole breadwinners of the house. Many cannot leave their homes to buy food for their families, take their children to school, or do any other necessary activity outside of the home to ensure their family’s survival and well-being. Nora and her organization work tirelessly to provide food and hygiene kits to these women and their families, as once put under house arrest they are forgotten and invisibilized by the government. They also provide much-needed emotional support as these women have little to no contact with those outside of their homes. The Rama currently works with over 800 formerly incarcerated men and women, who have not fallen to recidivism as a result of their employment and support through the MTE.

This kind of organizing and support is key to women who have to adjust to an entirely different life and environment once they are released from prison. As Nora shares, “I couldn’t find a place where I belonged [after I was released]… it’s almost like I missed prison.”

Many women have this idealized vision of what life will be like once they leave prison, but according to Nora, most are forced to reckon with the fact that the world has continued while they were inside, and are now faced with the additional challenges of discrimination, stigma and trauma. Upon their release, they also have a criminal record which makes it extremely difficult for them to find stable employment and housing. If they have children, the journey to get them back is a harrowing and often disappointing one given the increased stigma surrounding them as “bad mothers.”

Paulina, another formerly incarcerated woman from Argentina, understands these dynamics all too well. After being released from prison, she began working as a cartonera, collecting cardboards and other recyclable materials to sell as a way of supporting her 7-year-old son.

“Everyone closed their doors to me because, as you can see, I’m a little bit darker, with tattoos and a record… so you can imagine that it was very difficult for me,” she explains.

After being a cartonera for some time, she connected with other formerly incarcerated women and became part of the Federación Argentina de Cartoneros, Carreros y Recicladores, a network of unions focusing on cardboard pick-up and material recycling. Her work in organizing and coordinating these unions allowed her and her colleagues to work in different shifts and make a living. They pay particular attention to those in additional situations of vulnerability, such as those who are suffering from a substance use disorder, to make sure they feel surrounded by a community and see a path forward other than prison.

These organizations and cooperatives fill the space left behind by the national and local authorities when it fails to provide adequate social support and reintegration practices for women who have been deprived of their liberty. Many come out of prison with no identity documents, little to no money, and a very limited or no support network. Paulina describes it well, highlighting that “the State is present, but with police cars, never to help us with our most basic needs.”

The lack of support most formerly incarcerated women experience from the government, society, and sometimes their own loved ones points to an urgent need to destigmatize incarceration and recognize the situations of vulnerability that lead women to come into contact with the law in the first place. Further, it also underscores the importance of implementing policies that recognize the differentiated impact of prisons on those who identify as women and the harms caused by the criminal legal system. In Argentina, there is a legislative proposal that aims to reduce recidivism through labor inclusion practices for formerly incarcerated individuals by addressing:

The difficulty in accessing work for those who have been in prison and have a criminal record.

The major gaps in education and skills of most of those in prison, as well as inadequate educational rehabilitation programs within prisons.

The lack of adequate community and social integration spaces once people are released.

The inability to access basic rights, such as securing identification documents, protection from wage theft, and reliable access to mental health services.

The challenges presented by the use of house arrest, with very restrictive conditions that specifically impact women.

The passage of this legislation in Argentina would be an important step in the right direction to begin providing the support that incarcerated and formerly incarcerated women need to have a successful transition once they are released from prison. Nevertheless, the need for this legislation highlights how those who experience incarceration are stripped of their most basic rights not only during the time of their deprivation of liberty, but also for the rest of their lives.

Moreover, the use of alternatives to incarceration can contribute to the reduction of female imprisonment in Argentina and other Latin American countries. In Colombia, for example, the implementation of a law on alternatives to incarceration for women that are heads of household and living in situations of vulnerability could significantly reduce the number of women in prison by substituting time in prison with community service in ways that can help prepare them for formal employment opportunities. Ultimately, governments across the region need to dramatically reduce the number of women behind bars, given the disproportionate impact of incarceration on women, their children and their families and communities.

How women in Argentina are resisting the damages of incarceration

Recent cannabis debates have thrust the issue of cannabis potency back into the limelight. From UK calls to put cannabis in Class A because of rising potency and health harms, to leaked proposals from Germany to cap retail cannabis potency at 15% THC in their soon to be legalised market - the issue remains clouded with misunderstandings. Below is an edited excerpt from Transform's newly updated 3rd edition of 'How To Regulate Cannabis: A Practical Guide' that explores the potency issue; what does potency actually mean, how does it impact on cannabis related risks, and how can it be sensibly regulated?

There is a certain amount of confusion around the concept of cannabis potency­ — both ­what ­it ­means­ in ­technical ­terms,­ and ­what ­its ­implications­ are for the risks associated with the use of different cannabis products consumed in different ways. People are familiar with the concept of alcohol strength, expressed in percentage of alcohol content, and how this relates directly to the effects and risks of how much they consume. Standardised alcohol units are a good example. Key to their utility is that they can be readily translated between different alcohol products. However, the situation is less straightforward with cannabis, and cannot be directly compared for a number of reasons.

Cannabis potency is usually measured in terms of the percentage of its key psychoactive ingredient, Δ9-tetrahydrocannabinol (Δ9-THC or simply­ THC),­ but ­THC­ is ­only­ one ­of ­over­ 80 ­different ­cannabinoids­ found­ in ­the ­cannabis ­plant, ­key ­among ­these ­being ­cannabidiol ­(CBD).­ Because ­CBD­ interacts ­with ­and­ modifies ­the ­effects ­of ­THC,­ the ­ratio­ of the two is important not only as it shapes the nature of the subjective cannabis­ experience ­(CBD­ is­ thought­ to ­have ­a ­more­ sedative/calming ­effect), ­but­ also­ because­ CBD­ is­ thought­ to­ have ­anti-psychotic­ properties, ­potentially­ reducing the risks of psychotic episodes or psychotic illness related to cannabis use. The many other cannabinoids present in cannabis are less well understood but their relative proportions may also have subtle influences on the variable effects (and possibly risks) of different strains.

Lower-strength,­ outdoor-grown ­cannabis­ tends­ to­ be ­less­ than­ 10%­ THC,­ while (more commonly) indoor-grown, ‘premium’ cannabis varieties are predominantly in the­ 10-25% ­range.­ The­ potency ­of­ lower-quality ­and ­premium-grade­ resin has historically been roughly the same as this in European markets (but notably rising in recent years), although newer techniques such as solvent or carbon dioxide extractions have­ produced ­oils ­and­ other­ concentrates­, such ­as ­butane ­hash ­oil ­(BHO,­ the semi-solid forms sometimes known as ‘wax’ or ‘glass’)­, that­ have­ extremely ­high­ potencies,­ some­ reaching ­concentrations ­of­ over ­80%­ THC.

Another factor that complicates our understanding of cannabis potency is­ that­ the­ level­ of ­intoxication­ and­ the­ speed­ of­ onset ­of­ effects­, which­ will­ determine ­the ­subjective­ experience,­ depend ­in ­large­ part­ on­ the­ particular preparation, method of consumption, and using behaviours.

A ­given­ amount ­of­ cannabis ­can ­be­ smoked (or vaporised) ­in ­different­ ways­, in ­terms­ of how many inhalations the user takes, how deep the inhalations are and ­how ­long­ they ­are ­held ­in­ the ­lungs­, so ­the ­amount ­of ­active ­content­ that different individuals actually absorb can vary quite considerably. With smoked or vaporised cannabis, the onset of the effects is very rapid, meaning that individuals are able to dose control relatively easily. If they have not reached the desired effect, they will continue. If they have reached it, they can stop. On this basis, potency would seem to be less of a concern for­ inhaled ­cannabis ­use­, indeed ­higher-potency ­cannabis­ could­ mean­ fewer inhalations to achieve the same effect, thereby reducing respiratory risks. However, while such ‘auto-titration’ dose control behaviour is the norm, higher-potency cannabis can still potentially lead to higher total consumption and correspondingly pose greater risks. With more potent varieties a large dose of active content can be received in a single inhalation, and the larger such individual doses are, the harder it becomes to fine tune dosage control, meaning the potential to consume more than planned or desired is increased. This is particularly the case for novice users.

This risk of consuming more than planned (with potentially negative or undesirable effects) will be amplified when the potency of the cannabis being consumed is unknown. However, this problem can be reduced or effectively eliminated in a properly regulated system in which:

Buyers ­are­ able­ to­ choose ­from ­a ­range­ of­ clearly ­labelled ­products­ of­ different potencies

Buyers­ are­ able­ to ­take­ guidance­ from ­licensed, ­trained ­vendors

There ­is ­relevant ­information ­on ­dosage,­ effects ­and ­safer ­use­ at­ point­ of sale and on all packaging

In many parts of the world, notably in Europe, smoked cannabis is also often mixed with varying proportions of tobacco, effectively diluting its potency to levels below those that would be experienced if it were smoked pure, much in the same way that alcoholic spirits can be diluted with mixers to various degrees. While this may reduce some of the above risks relating to high-potency cannabis, any benefits are probably more than outweighed by the risks associated with smoked tobacco.

The increasing average potency of illegal cannabis is a genuine observed phenomenon in the US, and to a lesser extent in Europe, although what appears to be a long-term incremental rise in average potency has provoked many exaggerated ‘reefer madness’-style claims that have little basis in reality. In Western markets at least, the increasing market dominance of indoor-grown ‘premium’ cannabis, combined with likely actual increases in its potency (through selective breeding and developments in intensive growing technologies), has probably pushed average potency up to between two to three times what it was in­ the­ 60s­ and­ 70s.­ Such­ averages­ do,­ however, disguise a great deal of variety within markets and between different localities. There was of course very potent cannabis (particularly in resin form)­ available­ in ­the ­60s­ and­ 70s, ­so ­the­ suggestion that what is being consumed today is a ‘completely different drug’ is misleading: the observed trend is primarily due to there being a greater proportion of more potent varieties on the market.

The emergence of high potency concentrates like BHO is a comparatively recent phenomenon, so relatively little is known about their prevalence and impacts, particularly outside more established medical, and now non-medical markets in North America. But aside from these concentrates, if there is some truth in the 

‘it’s not what we smoked in the 60s’

 claims, it is due to the trend towards higher ratios ­of ­THC ­to­ CBD ­in ­intensively ­farmed­ higher-potency ­cannabis — with CBD­ content ­often ­falling ­to ­near ­zero ­as ­THC­ levels ­have steadily ­crept­ up. ­This ­change ­in ­the­ THC:CBD­ ratio­ ­results ­both ­from­ selective breeding that prioritises high THC content (which commands a higher price), as well some of the newer intensive growing techniques deployed to maximise turnover from a given grow space that can reduce CBD content.

The data on increasing potency is not especially reliable (based primarily on seizures which may not necessarily be a representative sample of markets) and conclusions are widely disputed. It is certainly the case, however, that both the general trend towards increasing potency of herbal cannabis and the ­parallel­ trend ­towards­ increasing­ THC ­to ­CBD ­ratios ­are ­not ­merely­ demand-driven, but are primarily manifestations of illegal market economics. There is an echo here of how, under US alcohol prohibition, the market shifted towards stronger spirits that provided significantly higher profits per unit weight for bootleggers. When alcohol prohibition ended, the market naturally shifted back towards sales of beers and wines. In many US and European markets it is now becoming hard to obtain ­anything ­except­ the­ more­ potent­ varieties­, even­ when individuals would prefer something milder if given the choice. The same shift has yet to be shown for legal markets in North America, suggesting that economic dynamics in more commercial jurisdictions may similarly be more concerned with profit opportunities than public health concerns. This highlights the important role for regulation to play to curb these interests and ensure a careful balance, while protecting public health.

Ensuring the THC and CBD content of all retail cannabis products is routinely tested

Although potency testing and monitoring of cannabis products can be relatively expensive, a reasonable level is not an excessive burden. It is important to acknowledge that technical challenges of accurate testing have often been flagged — noting that potency can vary widely within a crop, batch or even plant (or differing challenges for testing of edibles and other preparations). But such challenges are hardly insurmountable given rapid developments in sampling and testing methodology, and realistic error margins can be built into monitoring systems and regulations.

Routine testing should be built into any regulatory framework, supported by random test purchasing, and be undertaken or commissioned independently by the regulating authorities — with cost burden covered by taxation and producer and vendor licensing fees. The intensity of testing required will become clear from levels of compliance but should err on the side of more rather than less at the outset, in order to establish clear norms and expectations for market actors. The production and in particular sale of products that diverge significantly from their stated potency should be considered a serious licence violation. Allowable error margins and penalties for violations should be clearly established. For instance, Canadian regulations establish variability limits of 15-25% above or below the stated levels of THC and CBD depending on the type of cannabis product, and in some cases the stated potency.

Ensuring consumers are aware of the potency of all retail cannabis products — and their related risks

All retail products should be clearly labelled with potency information covering­ THC ­and ­CBD­ content.­ This ­should ­be ­supported­ with ­related­ information ­on ­risks, potentially­ with ­a­ simplified­ numerical­ (e.g.­1-5)­ strength guide. More detailed standardised information on cannabis potency and related risks should also be made prominently available at point of sale in all retail outlets. Vendors should be trained to give advice on potency and related risk issues.

Controlling the potency of retail products

Having an upper limit on the THC content of retail herbal or resin/oil cannabis for non-medical use could be seen as a sensible precautionary measure, but is problematic for a number of reasons, particularly in a more ­open ­market­ model. ­Beyond ­what­ many­ consumers ­may ­view ­as­ an unfair or unnecessary imposition, the obvious practical issues are exactly where such a threshold would be set and how it could be enforced.

In­ 2012 ­the ­Dutch­ government­ proposed­ a ­prohibition ­on ­sales ­of ­herbal­ cannabis ­over ­15%­ THC, ­although ­this­ move was not approved ­and­ was opposed by almost every government office (including the police, prosecution, and forensic service) that would be involved in enforcing the limit. Research into the proposal suggested that, while the measure could “in theory [provide] a slight health benefit for specific groups of cannabis users (i.e., frequent users preferring strong cannabis…)” in practice it reflected a “political choice and based on thin evidence”. The New Zealand 2020 draft Cannabis Legalisation and Control Bill proposed similar potency limits, promoted as a key way that regulation could take back control of the market and facilitate harm reduction aims. This highlights how such measures continue to be politically useful, even in lieu of evidence as to their practical impact.

Even if most consumers are unlikely to be concerned by an upper limit at or near this level (which would still be considered at least adequately strong herbal cannabis by most) the fact is that any such limit is inevitably quite arbitrary, and as such could lead to arbitrary enforcement outcomes. This is especially the case given the improving but still imperfect nature of both potency control among growers (even with the most carefully cultivated cannabis there will be a certain amount of potency variation between crops, and even within any given crop or sample) and potency testing technology.

If the aim is to encourage the use of lower-potency products as a way of moderating risks, then a more sensible approach would appear to be a combination of:

Strict product testing and labelling requirements that ensure buyers know exactly what they are consuming, enabling them to make informed choices

Consumer­ education­ about­ potency-related­ issues/risks,­ supported ­by­ packaging and point of sale info, and training requirements for vendors

Responsible ­retailing, ­which ­could ­be­ encouraged­ through ­licensing­ requirements for vendor training in how to provide potency and risk advice to purchasers

Variable ­tax ­rates (or other price controls), ­which ­could­ be ­employed ­in­ order ­to­ encourage­ the­ use of less potent products, as is done with alcohol in many countries

If limiting the potency of retail cannabis under a relatively open market model is problematic, under a more regulated market model such as that found in Uruguay it is less of a challenge, as the regulatory authorities license producers to provide the specified products that will be available for sale. Even in this more restricted scenario, cannabis ‘connoisseurs’, or those who desire higher-potency strains, can still be catered for either by provisions on home growing or cannabis social clubs.

Restrictions on sales of high-potency concentrates are a more reasonable proposition if such products are shown to be associated with significantly increased risks, but again such restrictions face the challenges of where any potency threshold should be drawn and how it would be enforced. Such decisions will be significantly shaped by the nature of existing demand and patterns of use. Certainly if there is little or no existing demand for high-potency concentrates, establishing a new framework for making them legally available is likely to be something regulators will naturally want to avoid (advocates for medical cannabis access have made the case that concentrates may have specific medical utility - but such availability is lilely to be via a different regulatory medical channel).

However, given the fast-rising popularity of concentrates in certain regions (particularly North America), prohibiting options for retail access where demand is already established would likely push many consumers back to the illegal market. In US states without regulated non-medical markets, 15% of cannabis consumers report using concentrates within the past 12 months (compared to 22% in legalising states). Legal access to concentrates could be provided instead through membership-based cannabis social clubs, although this could lead to difficulties regulating safe production practices. Some of the newer production techniques for concentrates (such as CO2 and butane extractions) are quite dangerous in inexperienced hands, so licensed production and availability is probably preferable if the alternative is risky home production. For these reasons, the Canadian Cannabis Act and Regulations prohibit at-home butane extraction, instead reserving the right to licensed cultivators, processors, testers and researchers.

If potency threshold limits are adopted for herbal cannabis and/or resin/concentrates­, and ­it ­seems ­inevitable­ that­ some­ jurisdictions­ will ­choose­ to­ do­ so­, it­ will ­be ­important ­to ­make ­sure­ they ­are set ­high­ enough­ to­ cater­ for the large majority of existing demand in a given jurisdiction. If they are set too low it will simply create an opportunity for unlicensed producers to meet the unsatisfied demand. There will need to be constant monitoring of impacts, and the flexibility to adjust (or abandon) such thresholds in response to evidence of their impacts and effectiveness.

Enforcement of any limits will also require a reasonable amount of tolerance, to allow for the imprecision of growers, and testing technology­, as discussed above. Any ­sanctions ­for threshold violations will ­also need ­to­ be ­proportionate.­ Such­ limits­ would sensibly be regarded more as a good practice guide for retailers or as a moderating influence on the potency of the products they sell. The aim should be to curb certain risky behaviours and prevent potency levels creeping up further, rather than to create a new form of prohibition that will needlessly penalise existing users or vendors in the future.

A ­different ­approach­ would­ be ­needed ­for­ edibles,­ with­ THC ­and­ CBD­ content by weight (and by standardised units if such a system is adopted) being clearly labelled on discrete single servings of any given edible product. What constitutes a single edible serving for an individual should ­be­ clearly­ defined­ and­ an­ upper­ limit ­on ­THC ­­content­ per serving (by weight or standardised units) should also be established.

The approach taken in Canada has been to establish an upper limit on THC content per 

 (i.e. the outermost package), albeit with no corresponding limit on CBD. In practical terms, this means that where there is only one discrete edible unit in a product container, that unit is limited to 10mg of THC. However, where there are four discrete units in a product container, each unit must be no more than 2.5mg of THC (and the potency of each unit must be the same, in any event). In practice, research has highlighted that consumers find it difficult to understand cannabis labelling that merely provides potency information in terms of milligrams of THC, with similar issues in relation to percentages. Effectively communicating potency information to consumers may therefore require developing an easily understandable numerical, colour-coded or traffic light-type scale as well as a standardised THC unit (see above).

There ­is ­a­ parallel ­issue­ around­ possible­ regulation­ of­ CBD content, and THC:CBD­ ratios.­ Attempting to establish an enforceable ratio limit would be even more problematic than THC content thresholds, not least as the scientific basis­ for­ judgements­ about­ the­ risks­ of­ any­ given­ THC:CBD­ ratio­ is­ not well established. For more restrictive regulatory models, it makes sense­ to ­ensure ­that ­licensed­ herbal or resin cannabis ­products­ all­ include ­a ­CBD­ ‘buffer’ — ranges of between 1-4% CBD, or a minimum 10:1 THC:CBD ratio, have been suggested as a starting point (albeit based on the limited available research). For less restrictive market models this will primarily need to be dealt with through clear product labelling, consumer education, and responsible retailing, all informed by the emerging body of knowledge on this particular question.

How to regulate cannabis potency?

A new report released today says Māori are three times more likey to die from a drug and alcohol overdose and highlights the need for a by Māori for Māori policy approach.

The New Zealand Drug Foundation report charts the non-intentional overdose deaths in Aotearoa between 2017 and 2021.

The analysis of coronial data shows an increase in fatal overdoses, which is not accounted for by the population growth over this period.

Māori Public Health organisation Hāpai Te Hauora says the NZ Drug Foundation report highlights concerning outcomes for Māori that must be proactively addressed in any policy response or risk worsening inequities.

"We commend the NZ Drug Foundation for raising awareness of these issues and reporting on key ethnicity data which show our people are three times more likely to die of an overdose than non-Māori," Hapai CEO Selah Hart said.

Aotearoa / New Zealand: Māori three times more likely to die from drug overdose, report reveals

The first three measures by the new Meloni government, the right-centre coalition which won the 25 September elections, have been a) to block the reform promoted by the Parliament to mitigate the harsher norms which regulate life prison sentences and other juridical innovations b) to block NGOs ships which save migrants in the Mediterranean sea, preventing disembarkation in a safe Italian harbour and c) to introduce a new norm in the penal code which 

On the 29th October more than 3.000 people met near Modena (northern Italy, Emilia Romagna region), coming from all over the country and also from other European countries, for the 

, the Halloween free party self-organized (without formal authorization by the local public authorities) for the third year by some Italian crews. The location was an industrial shed abandoned for years, in the open countryside, out of the city, with no real impact on local residents or the environment (the only inconveniences for people were some roadblocks by the police). People wished as usual to listen to music and to dance and, yes, also use drugs, up until the 1st November, thanks to free access to the event and self-organization. Some Harm reduction teams coming from different regions were on the spot to make the setting safer, through information, chill out, drug checking and first aid if necessary, in collaboration with the Public Health emergency units. No violence nor any type of incident occurred. Everything was proceeding in a safe and peaceful way.

Nevertheless, on the 30th October the new Interior Minister, Matteo Piantedosi, decided that the event had to be immediately blocked, participants dispersed and the building cleared out, sending hundreds of policemen in riot gear to the scene. Simultaneously with this order, Piantedosi announced the immediate proposal of introducing a new article of the Penal Code to “fill a regulatory gap” in order to be more effective in repressing free parties. In just 24 hours, on the 31st October, the new article was ready to be discussed at the Ministers Council, as an absolute political priority.

Fortunately, Piantedosi’s order was not implemented: the city Mayor and the local police decided to take time and negotiated for a peaceful evacuation without breaking into the shed, and the crews and the participants were willing to negotiate too, to avoid any risk of violence by the police and a hard conflict. The evacuation occured without any incident. Participants renounced the last night of music and dance, collected rubbish, cleaned the shed, then left Modena in dribs and drabs.

Nevertheless, they paid a high price: 1,380 people and 337 cars were identified and registered by the police, 25 Dutch people expelled, 14 organizers reported to the judicial authority, 14 sound systems seized for a total amount of 150,000 euros.

It is not the first time that in Italy the crews that organize free parties have been sanctioned: notwithstanding raves would be primarily considered as cultural and social events self-organized outside of a commercial dimension, and not as crimes, promoters have often had to deal with the penal code, mostly with regard to offences against private property, when they occupy private buildings or lands, and with other administrative norms which regulate public events. None of these norms, have ever been able to stop or prevent rave parties: the lesson learned over so many years is that repression is not effective against events which are so deeply rooted in peoples’ culture and social rituals, and the effects of repression could be only to increase the clandestine nature of the event and subsequent risks for participants’ health and safety.

Against any evidence, Piantedosi’s perspective is to increase repression, fulfilling the so called “regulatory gap” through a norm specifically addressed to raves.

The d.l. (decree law) n. 162/22 of 31.10.22 introduces a new article (art. 434-bis Penal Code, 

https://www.fuoriluogo.it/speciali/rave/norme-contro-i-rave-il-testo-del-decreto-legge/

invasion of lands or buildings to hold events dangerous for public order, or public safety or public health

This shifts the supposed offences related to raves from the Penal Code section dealing with 

 to the one dealing with major crimes such as 

slaughter, fire, flood, train wreck, explosive manufacture

The sanctions provided to organizers are 

Also, participants can be sanctioned with 

Furthermore, the proposal establishes a change in the Anti-Mafia law, in order to extend 

The consequence of this measure by the government on a juridical level is to exclude rave organizers from some extenuating circumstances and alternatives to prison related to minor crimes, due to the very high maximum penalty. Also, the very generic formulation of 

events dangerous for public order, or public safety or public health

 carries a high risk of criminalizing not only every kind of free party but also many other kinds of social events. Finally, it is most likely to be anti-constitutional (art 17, freedom of assembly), as there are many circumstances in which previous permission for public events by the local authorities is not required.

From a social, political and symbolic perspective, this new crime asserts that a rave party is anyway and always and primarily a danger for participants and for the community. This orients public opinion in supporting the repressive choice, also thanks to a strong and persuasive mass media campaign based on fake and manipulated communication. The use of drugs during these events is emphasised, showed as incontrollable and represented in a distorted way.

In presenting his law, Minister Piantedosi said that in many European countries rave parties are sanctioned, even if, on the contrary, it is really difficult to find such harsh measures in any other European legal regulation.

The Decree law is in force since 1st November. It must be discussed, possibly emended and approved by the Parliament by the end of December. If it is not approved it will expire. The government itself is working on some changes, considering the numerous criticisms from a juridical perspective, which may lead to its rejection by the Parliament.

A broad and plural movement is opposed to the new ‘rave crime’.

Many CSOs, professionals, PWUDs organizations, harm reduction teams, people from the world of culture and policy are taking a position against it and asking for the new law to be annulled.

Many jurists support the hypothesis of the anti-constitutionalist basis of this proposed law and many others contest the violation of the fundamental principle of proportionality of penalties.

CSOs and harm reduction professionals are going to inform and sensitize policy makers who will have the responsibility to vote for or against the new law in Parliament, about what a free party is, the possibility to promote participants health and wellbeing during such events thanks to an effective harm reduction and risks limitation system of interventions, the evidence-based failure of the repressive approach, the rights to assembly and associations and the fight against stigma. Also, a widespread information campaign with the media is going on, considering the impressive amount of fake news concerning free parties.

Great attention is also being paid to the risk that such a norm may include many other public events, such as social demonstrations and political protests, thus limiting the freedom of all citizens. This is of course a crucial point, but CSOs, PWUDs and Harm reduction professionals will need to be on guard that in defending other kinds of public events and freedom, rave parties do not become the ‘sacrificial victim’ of an unacceptable mediation.

Follow the ‘rave crime’ developments on Forum Droghe website,

Italian government moves to criminalise rave parties

Chemsex is on the rise in Asia despite the risks of harsh punishment and getting HIV, according to a new report.

 published on Tuesday by Harm Reduction International, a global drug health organisation, said that chemsex – where gay men take a mix of potent drugs to enhance group sex – and wider sex-related drug use among gay men is increasing in countries including Thailand, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Hong Kong, China, and Japan.

It said a rising number of gay men, especially young men living in cities in the region, known for its 

, have been involved in either chemsex or other types of sexualised drug use among men who have sex with each other. Experts believe the rise is due to an increase in the use of dating apps and social media communities, as well as wider drug supply in Asia.

Although the double stigma of being gay and taking illegal drugs in Asia makes it hard for researchers to get accurate figures, estimates from nine countries in the region suggest chemsex is more common than previously thought. For example, in Hong Kong and Malaysia more than one in 10 gay men interviewed had experienced chemsex in the last six months, while in Indonesia, China and Japan more than one in five had been involved in more general sexualised drug use.

Chemsex is on the rise in Asia despite harsh drug laws and massive stigma

Germany’s current interpretative approach puts the fate of the entire project for cannabis regulation on very thin ice. But there is still time to change course, and legally sound and politically viable alternative options are available.

The German government has released its ‘

’, a concept note laying out the key points to shape the regulation of the recreational cannabis market. Presenting the key points at a press conference this week, 

 that it had not been easy to reach agreement within the ‘Ampel’ coalition and between the involved ministries. Clearly one of the trickiest issues has been how to deal with the legal hurdles of the UN drug treaties and EU law. The Minister presented what he called the ‘

’ as the government’s Plan A, which will be submitted to the European Commission in hopes of a green light that would allow the legislation to proceed. But if the EC rejects Germany’s ‘interpretative solution’, there will be no legal regulation unless another legal accommodation can be negotiated. Regarding a Plan B, the 

 vaguely mention the possibility that the proposed legislation 

“can be accompanied by Germany's advocacy for certain amendments/updates at EU and international law level”

Unfortunately, Germany’s Plan A approach risks bringing the whole regulation project onto legally very thin ice, for several reasons. Let’s make clear from the outset that TNI fully supports the intention to legally regulate the cannabis market, as we have done in the case of Uruguay, Canada, Mexico, Malta and now also Colombia. TNI has been working for several years now with a group of international lawyers, treaty experts and government officials to explore the most viable options to accommodate the legal regulation of cannabis markets under international law. With due respect for basic principles of international law, and staying within the realm of faithful treaty interpretation, we have laid out in detail 

the legal tensions and the available compliance options

’ now proposed by Germany, does not appear on the menu of viable solutions elaborated by the group of treaty experts we convened, as it can be easily contested and dismissed on legal grounds.

German cannabis regulation on thin ice - The government’s risky approach to international legal obstacles puts the entire project in jeopardy

Featuring interviews with our policy analysts along with people working farther afield, Not a Crime will highlight the impact of criminalization on people living with HIV and people who use drugs over the coming months.

In the premiere English language episode, HIV Legal Network policy analyst India Annamanthadoo talks to senior policy analyst Mikhail Golichenko about drug policy in Russia and the Eastern Europe and Central Asia region. Learn more about how repressive laws and policies in the region frustrate the response to HIV and undermine the human rights of people who use drugs, and how advocates there and around the world are mobilizing for change.

Our first French episode, also released today, features HIV Legal Network senior policy analyst Cécile Kazatchkine in conversation with Modeste Mambo Amisi, epidemiologist and executive director of HODSAS, about how he came to be an activist for HIV and human rights and how the laws in the Democratic Republic of Congo affect non-disclosure.

Stay tuned for future English episodes as we delve deeper into HIV criminalization to examine how criminal laws target communities at the margin, while our next French episode takes us to Morocco for a conversation with Moulay Ahmed Douraidi, a well-known activist, about HIV non-disclosure in a country that doesn’t have specific laws governing disclosure and how people living with HIV are targeted all the same.

Listen to an introduction from HIV Legal Network Executive Director Janet Butler-McPhee.

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