The next stage in the Dutch experiment with regulated marijuana protection starts on Monday, with “coffeeshops” in 10 different local authorities now only allowed to sell legally produced hashish.

 since April, but now their hashish sales are also restricted to the legal circuit.

, the shop owners and researchers worry that domestic hashish will not replace popular Moroccan products on the menu, and that means that criminals may still have a role in the supply chain.

Dutch hashish only in 10 towns as legal marijuana trial moves on

I approach this topic with humility. I am a white settler living on unceded Quw’utsun territory — in what is colonially known as Duncan, British Columbia — and check nearly every box on the wheel of privilege. So when I write about the intersections of drug policy, Indigenous rights and sovereignty, and the ongoing harms of colonization, I acknowledge both the limitations of my perspective and responsibility to act in solidarity.

On the trail of coca prohibition’s environmental and community devastation

I’m currently a master’s student in justice studies, and over the past two years I’ve been deeply engaged in learning about the social and environmental impacts of prohibitionist drug policies. What first sparked this inquiry was a report from Health Poverty Action called 

Revealing the Missing Link to Climate Justice: Drug Policy

— which examines how prohibition drives drug production and trafficking into ecologically sensitive areas, props up violent organized crime, and obstructs both climate and community stability.

That report led me to learn more about Colombia’s recent history—about communities resisting the return of aerial fumigation campaigns meant to destroy illicit coca crops. I read a 

 from Indigenous, Afro-descendant, rural, and civil society organizations urging the Colombian government to stop using glyphosate, a controversial herbicide sprayed from planes in efforts to eradicate coca. They described a pattern of triple deforestation: clearing forest to grow coca, having it fumigated, and then clearing even further into the forest to replant.

The deeper I went, the more connections I saw: between armed conflict and land degradation, between militarized “solutions” and displaced families, between drug war tactics and environmental collapse. The more I learned, the more it became clear: coca is not the enemy. It never was.

An opportunity to undo a broken policy of colonial erasure

In October 2025, the World Health Organization’s Expert Committee on Drug Dependence (ECDD) will consider its recommendations on the international control of the coca leaf, following a ‘critical review’ process. The ECDD will then formally present its recommendations to the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) — the primary intergovernmental drug-policymaking body of the UN — at its ‘reconvened’ session, in December of this year.

This review of the coca leaf’s status is a long-overdue opportunity to 

. This isn’t just a niche policy debate. It’s a pivotal moment with global implications for environmental justice, Indigenous rights, and international drug policy.

The current system doesn’t work. Coca remains strictly prohibited, despite a growing number of exceptions at the national level. Bolivia has long 

 as part of its national heritage, with over three million people consuming 19,000 metric tons of leaf annually. Argentina allows possession for personal use, and Colombia and Peru maintain legal cultivation systems for traditional and nutritional uses. These realities clash with outdated treaty obligations that still classify coca as a harmful drug.

Meanwhile, approximately 200,000 families in Colombia alone rely on coca cultivations for survival — many of them Indigenous and Afro-descendant communities living in regions historically impacted by armed conflict and displacement. Prohibition has criminalized their livelihoods, empowered organized crime, and hindered the development of legal, sustainable alternatives.

For decades, governments have waged war not only on the plant but on the Andean and Amazonian communities who have used it safely and respectfully for generations. The results are destroyed forests and biodiversity hotspots, displaced families, and a booming informal trade of derivatives, such as cocaine. The harms of prohibition are, as so often, not just ‘unintended’ side effects but predictable outcomes of policies built on punitive, racist, colonial logics.

The international community stands at a crossroads. And there are two futures ahead.

In one future — the path we are currently on — governments opt to double down. The coca leaf stays on Schedule I. Communities continue to be displaced. Forests continue to fail. Militarized enforcement escalates. Organized crime flourishes. And despite it all, cocaine production and use continue to rise. It’s the same failed cycle we’ve been trapped in for decades.

There is another way forward, rooted in social justice, imagination and political courage.

In this future, the coca leaf is de-scheduled — acknowledging its benefits, ancestral uses, and untapped potential — and the differences between the plant and its chemically-processed and potent derivatives is made clear.

The concert of nations recognizes what the WHO’s suppressed ‘

’ found decades ago: that traditional coca use has no negative health effects and provides positive social, spiritual, and medicinal benefits. Indigenous leaders and nations are heard, after years of calling for the international system to stop obstructing culture in the name of law and order.

Indigenous communities are no longer punished for practicing their traditions. Currently-persecuted farmers grow coca openly and legally, using it for teas, flour, and natural remedies. States regulate cultivation and formalized supply chains, fostering innovation as well as reparations. The violence that once followed prohibition begins to wane as coca is brought into the light.

We can’t undo the past. But we can stop repeating it.

Removing coca from the most restrictive category in international drug control treaties wouldn’t legalize cocaine. It would simply allow countries the legal space to regulate coca for traditional, medicinal, and nutritional purposes. It would support sustainable development initiatives and reduce the power of illegal markets. And crucially, it would affirm Indigenous rights and cultural practices long undermined by colonial logic.

Legal coca markets already exist — in Bolivia, Peru, and beyond. They gesture towards beneficial modes of regulation. And, contrary to common fears, are unlikely to expand cocaine production. Cocaine requires 

 and resources; prohibiting the leaf hasn’t stopped its production — if anything, it’s enabled more harmful, unregulated methods.

This moment isn’t just a normative question but a matter of justice. It’s about healing. About ending the selective use of international law to suppress Indigenous knowledge and traditions.

The coca review process enables the international community to begin a process to decolonize a drug control system that was never built to serve the people most impacted by it.

* This blog post is produced within the framework of Corey Ranger’s internship at the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC), as part of his MA in Justice Studies programme at Royal Roads University.

Reviewing the coca leaf’s international status: A chance to heal what Prohibition broke

Considering existing models in the United States, Uruguay, and Canada, this policy commentary highlights the need for context-specific regulatory frameworks for adult use cannabis markets that align with national objectives. Colombia, a major player both in the global cocaine trade and the regional cannabis market, faces unique challenges in its quest in regulating cannabis for adult use. This policy commentary provides insights into the Colombian cannabis context, outlining the objectives necessary for designing an effective regulated market with social equity considerations. The policy recommendations address critical enablers such as developing public health policy for cannabis use, improving urban and rural security conditions, and setting up a market transition process that foster fair competition, social equity, and environmental sustainability. The recommendations center on developing a licensing model for producers and retailers that facilitates the integration of illicit and “gray” industry participants in the newly regulated market. Beyond well-known measures (such as prohibiting access to minors, restricting advertising, setting up strict packaging and quality controls, launching educational campaigns), the policy brief emphasizes a strategic sequence in policymaking that can promote the growth of an equity-focused cannabis industry. This entails characterizing the current cannabis market, framing the launch of the transition via pilot programs that can make rapid policy adjustments, and designing a tax framework that fosters the absorption of the illegal industry. Recognizing the gradual nature of this transformative process, the article urges a shift in public discourse towards nuanced discussions about regulatory decisions and away from the social desirability of cannabis regulation.

Transitioning to legality: How to regulate the adult use cannabis market in Colombia

Legalizing cannabis impacts law enforcement strategies on drug deterrence. While cannabis possession arrests have fallen post-legalization, findings on racial disparities are mixed. No research has yet investigated cannabis legalization effects on police behavior in the form of drug seizures, or how it may influence the enforcement of other drugs. We sought to evaluate the effect of cannabis legalization on drug seizures and their related disparities by race to understand how law enforcement have adjusted to this rapidly shifting legal landscape.

Drug seizure data were collected from the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) and include state, race, and drug types from 16 states with over 95 % population coverage for 2017–2022. Treatment and control assignments were determined by whether cannabis had been legalized for adult use between 2017 and 2022. Log seizure rates and Black-white risk ratios were calculated using census data. Two-way fixed effects difference-in-differences models robust to multiple treatment periods evaluated the effect of cannabis legalization on seizure rates and Black-white risk ratios.

Our findings indicate that cannabis legalization significantly reduced overall drug seizures, particularly those involving cannabis. Of the other seizure types tested, only one non-cannabis drug seizure rate type was significant. We found a moderate yet significant decrease in the Black-white risk ratio for cannabis seizures, though all other racial disparities in seizure rates persisted after the legalization of cannabis.

Cannabis legalization was associated with reduced drug seizures overall, driven by a large reduction in cannabis seizures. There was also a significant reduction in the Black-white risk ratio for cannabis seizures, though Black individuals remained at higher risk for all drug seizure types compared to white individuals. While expected to decrease without cannabis smell to prompt seizures, non-cannabis drug seizures were unchanged except for an increase in methamphetamine seizures not involving cannabis, potentially due to shifting enforcement priorities. These results suggest that cannabis policy reform can alleviate law enforcement burdens and may improve racial disparities in drug seizures to a small extent yet highlight the continued necessity for policies addressing systemic biases in drug enforcement.


 to read the full article (restricted access).

State adult-use cannabis policy effects on law enforcement efforts to disrupt drug markets

On the eve of her departure from her post as the Ambassador of Colombia to Austria and Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Vienna, we spoke to Ambassador Laura Gil about her time in Vienna, her achievements, the challenges she faced as well as her hopes for the future of international drug policy.

As the Ambassador At-Large for Drug Policy, she worked with other Member States to break the long-standing Vienna consensus on drugs which led to the first ever resolution that specifically mentioned ‘harm reduction’ being adopted by vote in 2024, while at the last CND in March 2025, Colombia led a resolution that creates an independent expert panel that will conduct a long-over review of the UN drug control ‘machinery’. Her leadership has been exceptional and sets a new high bar for inclusive and engaged diplomacy at the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. She leaves Vienna in mid-July 2025 to take up a new position in Washington DC as the Assistant Secretary-General of the Organisation of American States. We produced this video in cooperation with the 

, and the reporter was Ann Fordham, executive director if the IDPC.

Ambassador Laura Gil (Permanent Representative of Colombia to the UN in Vienna):

 As a Colombian, I feel that the current drug policy regime has wronged my country in so many ways that I think it is a life cause to change it. I like to have a system that moves away from Prohibition. I know it's hard, I know it will take a long time, but I think it will be the only way to make drug policy coherent and to save lives.

 Eventually, it will happen. Perhaps not in my lifetime, but it will happen. Civil society has been working for so long trying to get this regime changed, and the feeling that there's a little hope that this might happen fills me with satisfaction. If you talk honestly, with purpose, sometimes agreements can be reached. And in the end, the best one can do is to try. Because oftentimes I thought: well, why am I going to try this in Vienna? Nothing is going to happen in Vienna. And look, it did happen. So one has to try. The worst that can happen is that one will fail.

: Good afternoon. My name is Ann Fordham. I'm the Executive Director of the International Drug Policy Consortium. And I'm here with you, Ambassador Laura Gil, in your beautiful residence in Vienna. And outside, they're preparing your leaving do, as you're about to leave us for an exciting new position at the Organization of American States. Over the last two years that you've been here with us in Vienna, you have been so inspirational. So many of us from civil society and other member states have admired your courage, your leadership, your honesty, and how you've always been very clear about how the war on drugs has been extremely harmful for so many people around the world, especially people back in your home country of Colombia. You've had so many incredible achievements, which we'll talk about in a minute. But first of all, let me ask you: how are you feeling as you're about to leave Vienna?

: Sad, very sad. I feel that I would have wished for more time here to finish some things I've begun. But, you know, life has a way of surprising you, and now it's taking me somewhere else. Yes.

: Yeah, and this topic of drug policy reform — I’ve observed you for the last two years in Vienna — seems to have really inspired you and captured your imagination in some way. What is it about the issue of drugs and drug policy that has made you so engaged and committed to this work?

: Being Colombian, I guess. As a Colombian, I feel that the current drug policy regime has wronged my country in so many ways that I think it's a life cause. My life cause. I discovered here in Vienna that it has become my cause. It was not only my work, it has become my cause. I am absolutely convinced that if you want to save lives, if you want to show solidarity, if you want to make the world a better place, we need to change this really, really antiquated — and, you know, the global drug regime is an antique already. We should just save it, you know, as an antique to show it. But we have to change it.

: Absolutely, Jurassic. Jurassic, absolutely.

: So, looking back at your time here in Vienna, what would you consider to be your greatest achievements with relation to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and perhaps the broader international drug control system?

: What I think I leave behind is a coalition of 62 countries. And if you ask what is the most important thing I did, I think this coalition is the most important thing. And the members of this coalition have the responsibility to nurture it, to keep it alive. This is a coalition that is not only on paper, that awakens when a statement needs to be signed or something needs to be said. This is an active coalition, a strategic coalition that met in this room — in this very, very, you know, in this room — periodically, sometimes weekly, sometimes every two weeks. Not a month went by without a meeting of the coalition here. So that coalition feeds on dialogue and on compromise. I would like to see this coalition alive and well from where I'll be sitting in Washington, D.C. So, you know, when I arrived in Vienna, I arrived feeling defeated because I was sent here — I was Deputy Foreign Minister — and I was sent here. And my feeling was, what am I going to do in Vienna? Nothing ever happens in Vienna. This is going to be the most boring job I will ever have because I will not be able to change anything in Vienna. And now I'm leaving with a sense of purpose and satisfaction, and knowing that whatever we did here in Vienna began something, stirred something up. Civil society has been working for so long trying to get this regime changed. And the feeling that there's a little hope that this might happen fills me with satisfaction.

: And you have given so many of us that hope — that that’s possible. Under your guidance here in Vienna, Colombia has undoubtedly played a leading role in calling for a more humane and evidence-based drug policy. And of course, while you've made many achievements, what would you say have been your biggest challenges operating also in this very traditionally rigid space of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs?

: Well, let me begin by saying this: I never intended to play a leading role in anything. I am a builder of things. So what I wanted is for Colombia to have partners — good partners. I wanted Colombia to play well and to play fair. So we dedicated as much time from the weakest to the strongest, from the smallest to the largest — we dedicated a lot of time to engage with every single member of this community here in Vienna. The biggest challenge I faced is the question of responding to those who give their backs to scientific evidence. It is very hard when you are in one of those rooms at the UN to have one country get up and say things like, 'Oh, the largest number of overdoses are caused by cannabis.' We heard that in the room. And the diplomatic setting doesn't give you enough room to be able to reply to every single fake news voiced by a country. So for me, that was very, very hard — not only in terms of work, but personally.

: You've set a new standard, I think, for inclusive diplomatic engagement in this setting. And it's been, again, just incredible to watch you operate. And one of the major milestones that you've achieved during your time here was the resolution that just passed at this last CND that sets up an independent panel to review the UN drug control machinery, as is written in the resolution. Can you share what your hopes are that this panel will achieve and why it's so important?

: Well, I think an independent review of the global drug regime was overdue. I mean, Colombia can get up — and Colombia and many partners of Colombia can get up — and claim that this regime is not delivering. But we need some independent voices to do so. And I think this panel gives us an opportunity to say the areas in which it may be delivering something. Who knows? Maybe there are some. I fail to see them, really. That’s why we need someone else to judge this regime — because I fail to see any… any, you know, the results of this regime. But that’s why we wanted some independent body that would take a critical look and tell us what’s working and what’s not working. And I hope that’s the beginning of change.

: Under your leadership, Colombia really brought a strong focus on human rights, development, and peace building to the drug policy debate here in Vienna. How can the UNODC and the CND continue the momentum for that important work?

: Okay. UNODC will not do anything by itself. Unless countries — member states — are there to press UNODC to do the right thing, UNODC will not do it. And I like to remember: when I first arrived, I went to a gathering organised by civil society with member states, and I was mentioning how Colombia was ready to break the Vienna Consensus because we would no longer abide by a consensus that does not serve my country. And as I was saying that, you know, I could see the audience rolling their eyes, thinking, 'Oh, we’ve heard that before — it never happened.' And I was absolutely convinced that I would make that happen. And I made it happen — with a harm reduction resolution. But it was a huge political cost for my country. And it was something that — for Colombia — harm reduction is very important. We’ve been doing harm reduction since 2000-something, 2007. The current government, the current president, when he was Mayor of Bogotá, he made harm reduction one of the most important public health policies he had. So harm reduction was very important. But the issues that Colombia faces go well beyond harm reduction. I mean, harm reduction was fundamental for European countries who have harm reduction in their European Union’s drug policy. But none of the European countries were authorised to break the consensus. We took it upon ourselves to do this because we thought it was the right thing. It was not the most important thing for Colombia — but it was the right thing to do. We did it. And then UNODC did not even mention it [harm reduction] in the World Drug Report. Not in the one immediately [prior], not in this one. Actually, I even said — as I said my farewell words at the CND — that I was leaving without the dream of actually seeing harm reduction in the World Drug Report. So the only way to keep UNODC honest is to have member states engage with them and press them to do the right thing. You know, I did not hesitate to send notes verbales showing our disappointment. I think more countries perhaps could consider doing something like that. UNODC — when we talked to them about harm reduction — the answer was, 'Well, it is not accepted by every single member state.' Well, they are part of the secretariat. It’s a resolution. It was voted. It had the votes. It won. So it is not for them to judge whether it is an acceptable concept or not. It is a concept. It is a policy adopted by a UN body — period. So I think we need a new UNODC. And I hope one of the things the panel actually looks at is this very, very dysfunctional architecture of drugs — beginning with UNODC. Because you see, for Colombia the problem is the following. Colombia is the fourth largest donor to UNODC. Most of the implementation of our policy — drug policy — is done through UNODC in Colombia. So you have this really funny situation — well, funny is not the word, because it didn’t make me laugh — but very paradoxical situation in which UNODC in Colombia, they pretty much tell you everything you want to hear because they need your money, and here they push back on everything you do.

: Indeed, it's deeply dysfunctional. And on the issue of harm reduction, civil society is also incredibly frustrated with the position that the UNODC continues to take on harm reduction. And of course we were so emotional and inspired when the resolution finally got through — breaking the consensus in decades at the CND to get harm reduction into a resolution explicitly stated by the CND. So that was really an incredible watershed moment for civil society.And on the topic of civil society, you have always been an incredibly powerful advocate for the meaningful participation of civil society. You've engaged so constructively with civil society, sought input from civil society, and really taken guidance from them. What advice do you have for other member states and for the UNODC for how to further ensure the meaningful and inclusive participation of civil society in these drug policy debates?

: How to lose fear. It’s very simple to lose fear. I think member states fear civil society. And I come from civil society. I have nothing to fear. I know that one can build partnerships — real partnerships — with civil society. And to be truthful, I would not have done any of what I did if I had not worked so closely with civil society, for several reasons. As I said, when I arrived, I was basically resigned to the fact that I was not going to be able to do anything in Vienna — that this was the place where nothing happens. So it was through talks with civil society that I found a roadmap. The roadmap Colombia had here was collectively built. It was not the ambassador thinking in an office, you know: 'what to do next?' We built this with national civil society and with international civil society. And then we discussed it with the coalition members. Colombia didn’t do what Colombia wanted, you know? To go back to the resolution of the panel — the panel, the resolution is not the one we wanted. We would have wanted something much stronger. We would have wanted much more participation from the Secretary-General. But it's what Colombia negotiated — managed to negotiate. And I'm proud of the negotiation because the negotiation is what's going to make it legitimate. It’s what’s going to make this report — whatever comes out of this report — real for discussion. Had I just counted the numbers and said: 'okay, we're going to plough through and get the win anyway,' I think the report would turn dead on arrival, basically. So, that sort of, openness to dialogue, I think, is what marked our relationship with civil society. It is in the DNA of my government to have this sort of relationship with civil society. But it goes, I think, further than that — because it was easy for me. It was easy in the sense that I didn’t have to do it as a job. I built sincerely with civil society. And I think whatever we got — good or bad — we got it together.

: We did. And I think it’s fair to say that from civil society’s perspective — at least from IDPC and many of our colleagues — we felt your partnership and your collegiality and collaboration very strongly, and we will miss it dearly. And we hope that, yeah, you’ve set a good example for other member states to demonstrate what can be done when you do it in partnership with other member states — but also with civil society. In the next few months, the World Health Organization will release its recommendations for either the de-scheduling or the rescheduling of the coca leaf from the UN drug control treaties. Can you say a few words about why this process has such critical importance for Colombia?

: For Colombia, it has a huge importance because, first of all, it’s a matter of fixing a historical wrong — about how the coca leaf was scheduled. But it goes beyond that. It will give support — political support — to what the government wants to do, which is to find some industrial use of the coca leaf. Right now — and for as long as cocaine is not regulated — we have a plant that is valued by our Indigenous Peoples, and it’s being satanised outside Colombia — it’s being demonised outside Colombia. So we have this plant that grows freely in my country, and we need to do something with it — something that can compete with the drug dealers. So I only see two options: Either you go for the regulation of cocaine and you make this a legitimate business — you know, we are very far from going in that direction. The other direction is to find some industrial use for this coca plant so that the peasants in my country can find another way to make money. So, independently of what happens with WHO, I think both Bolivia and Colombia have made their best efforts to present their case. We'll see what happens. But as we were preparing the documents, the plant itself has been so demonised that we didn’t even have research to show that the coca leaf is not harmful to your health. We did have research — we didn’t have as much as we wanted — and I have been trying to do a number of things: trying to bring the plant to Europe to do research on the plant and to see other alternatives — medical alternatives, some sort of... And it is very, very hard to find a way, a legal way to get the plant out of Colombia. One could be very sarcastic and say that as soon as something is suspected that can be done with this plant, of course we will move into regulation very quickly because those who want to make money will like to have all the patents. So, we are stuck right now. We cannot move on research — although actually the conventions allow them — but try to get a permit to do research on a plant! And, then, the question of patents. In my country, some populations are very scared that if we do not protect the plant, eventually some use will be found and someone else will patent that use.

: I mean, genuinely, that seems to be a real concern. And how best can we protect against that? The sort of corporate capture of the coca plant?

: I think we need to do a state-to-state agreement. We are proposing one to Czechia. We’ll see if that works. That’s one of the things I’m leaving without having finished. But we are proposing to Czechia that, under their new regulation, they help us do research on the plant.

: So, with respect to Geneva, we see that Colombia has become more actively engaged than ever in relation to the Human Rights Council. Can you share a little about how Colombia incorporates human rights into its broader foreign policy objectives?

: Traditionally, Colombia has always been open to scrutiny. Even though we had a very serious and concerning human rights situation inside the country, we realised very, very early on that international actors were there to help us — not to attack us. So we opened up to scrutiny generally in human rights in the early 1990s, which was quite notable back then. And since then, we have incorporated — we have integrated — human rights into practically every aspect of foreign policy. For a long time, Colombia was very afraid of the Human Rights Council because we thought: 'Well, why would a country with so many human rights problems be part of it?' And now we are part of it. We were elected this year, and we will make our membership in the Human Rights Council count — for drug policy. We have several things we want to do there. We want to make the issue of drugs and human rights a permanent item of the Human Rights Council. And we hope to have the support of OHCHR to do that. It will be hard, but we need more reports for discussion — like the one Commissioner Türk presented a few years ago. Yes, with all our national failings — you know, we’re very far from being the country that fully respects human rights — we’re far from that. But it’s always been our aspiration. And I think that’s what’s reflected in our foreign policy. We are committed to making human rights one of the pillars of our international engagement.

: Following the recent resignation of Ghada Waly, what do you think should be the requirements for the new Executive Director of UNODC? What should they seek to achieve?

: Well, I think what a senior international official should do is provide assurances to all countries. So, I think what we’ve seen so far at UNODC is that they seem to be part of the conversation — they take sides in the conversation. I want a UNODC that is willing to ensure that the conversation can take place without bias, that it can guarantee, facilitate, and most of all implement the decisions of member states. It’s not for UNODC to decide which decisions they implement and which they don’t. That’s for member states to decide. So, I want someone who is visionary, who can speak directly to member states, who is respected by member states. You know, I’ve been thinking a lot — now I’m going to hold a senior position in a regional organisation — and I’ve been thinking: well, how do I want to position myself now that I’ve seen what I like and don’t like here in Vienna? I want to be like Rafael Grossi, not like Ghada Waly.

: Maybe you could say a little bit about what are the key differences between those two individuals?

: Well, one very simple one. Rafael Grossi is always there. He’s always present for every member state in every meeting. Ghada Waly is never there. Rafael Grossi is the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency — quite popular these days, or quite popular with some countries — but he’s in the news a lot given the Iranian–Israeli–United States strikes. But, for me, he is what you need in an international civil servant. And I would like to be able to show as much enthusiasm, energy, and acceptance by member states in Washington as Grossi has been able to obtain here in Vienna. So being present and guiding member states. Being present, listening, talking. I think the most we can do from international organisations is to make sure the conversations take place. Provide the space for difficult conversations to take place. We cannot go and decide for member states, but we need to be able to provide the space for the conversations to take place and to respect the decisions of member states.

: I understand this was your first job in a diplomatic posting. For those outside of the profession, it often seems that this space in Vienna is quite rigid and fossilised, but it also must have had some upsides. What have you come to appreciate about diplomacy in these past two years?

: What I’ve been telling all my colleagues is that being straightforward pays. I think the way I talk — without beating around the bush, being very clear, concise, straight talk — I think that was so weird in Vienna that it actually broke with unwritten rules. And I think that would be my message to everyone: just say what your country needs. Don’t decorate it too much. Say it.

: You have certainly done that. And so what is your top recommendation for the next Ambassador of Colombia?

: Look, right now what I think is that we have done the things we needed to do. Right now, we need the carpentry — you know, we need to make sure this panel is put in place. There are powerful forces trying to keep it from being put in place. So I want my successor to concentrate on this and to be able to guarantee that Colombia’s resolution is not put aside.

: As you leave this role for the OAS, how do you think you will stay engaged on the issue of drug policy reform? What opportunities might there be there for you to continue with this work?

: I’ll be in a different position where drugs will not be part of my portfolio. But as I said, this for me has become a life cause. It has become a life cause because it matters to my country, but it has become my life cause because it’s a human rights cause. So I will keep engaged with Vienna. I will come visit you. I will keep up with the developments, and whenever I see an opportunity, I will use it. As I said, I will not be in a position where I could push forward the progressive views I have on drug reform. But I think my region also needs to have difficult conversations. And I will make sure that I can help provide the space to have these difficult conversations. We guarantees to all, of course, but I think we cannot keep on postponing some conversations. And as difficult as they might be, the negotiated resolution on the panel showed me that if you talk honestly, with purpose, sometimes agreements can be reached. And in the end, the best one can do is to try. Because oftentimes I thought, well, why am I going to try this in Vienna? Nothing is going to happen in Vienna. And look — it did happen. So one has to try. Try. The worst that can happen is that one will fail.

: Indeed. As you prepare to leave us here in Vienna, what are your hopes for the future of the international drug control system? What changes would you like to see in the next five to ten years?

: I’d like to have a system that moves away from Prohibition. I know it’s hard. I know it will take a long time. But I think it will be the only way to make drug policy coherent and to save lives. I want a drug regime that turns its back on Prohibition. The end of Prohibition — eventually. It will happen. Perhaps not in my lifetime, but it will happen.

: And finally, what message would you like to give to civil society and drug policy reform advocates who are working tirelessly to shift the regime away from Prohibition and towards health, human rights, peace and development?

: Laura, thank you so much for everything. And yeah, it’s very difficult to accept that you will no longer be here in Vienna with us. As we started the interview — I mean really — you have been inspirational for so many here in Vienna. And as you said, that was kind of the strapline: 'Nothing ever happens in Vienna.' You know, it was a moribund and sort of seemingly hopeless place for progress before you came along and you breathed fresh air and fresh energy into this debate. And yeah, I think many of us who’ve been working here for a long time do feel reinvigorated by your presence and re-energised and more hopeful — even though you won’t be here with us. But you’ll still be with us, I believe. So thank you so much. And we wish you all the best in Washington. And yeah — please come visit us often.

: Thank you. I’m sure I’ll be here. I told you — it has become a life cause for me.

'Changing the current drug policy regime has become a life cause for me' – An interview with Colombia’s ambassador-at-large for drug policy, Laura Gil

Gloria Lai, Regional Director of the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC), contends the prescription mandate was rushed in response to high-profile cases of foreigners illegally exporting cannabis.

She warns the policy will devastate the retail sector, “With about 10,000 outlets nationwide, 90% will likely close. Some foreigners might cooperate with the doctor’s note, but Thais will simply go back to growing their own,” she told Thai PBS World.

Prasit Nunual, Secretary General of Thailand’s Cannabis Future Network, notes closures have already begun due to oversupply and falling demand. He casts doubt on the prescription model’s feasibility: “It might be no different from the required letter for a driving licence – causing inconvenience, not genuine health oversight

Thailand’s cannabis U-turn: Operators have weeks to adapt as recreational use faces ban

Belgium is one of the largest producers of MDMA (ecstasy) in the world. The illegal production and sale of ecstasy is a source of income for organised crime and has a negative impact on public health, the environment and society.

In 2023, Belgium took a significant step in the discussion on drug policy by organising the XTC Expo. This exhibition allowed visitors to discover what a legal, regulated ecstasy market might look like. Through three fictional spaces—smartshop, pharmacy and nightclub—the expo invited people to imagine and experience alternative futures.

The XTC Expo was the first of its kind. With over 1,200 visitors and 900 survey responses, it revealed strong public support for a legally regulated market with strict controls. This final report presents the concept, the fictional spaces, the responses of visitors and the lessons learned.

XTC Expo – Final report

Thailand set to U-turn on recreational cannabis use

Thailand decriminalized cannabis in 2022. However, it did so without a comprehensive law regulating its sale, production or use.

Since then, tens of thousands of licensed dispensaries and retailers selling cannabis and cannabis extracts have opened across the country, particularly in tourist hot spots.

Three years later, Thailand is now planning to tighten the control of marijuana use, ensuring that cannabis is only used for medicinal purposes and not recreationally.

Under a new medical bill expected to be announced in the next few weeks, dispensaries will be allowed to sell cannabis only to other licensed shops or to customers with a prescription from a medical professional.

Chokwan "Kitty" Chopaka, a well-known cannabis activist in Thailand, said the new medical bill could see a 90% drop in licensed cannabis shops in Thailand.

The Netherlands expanded a government-run initiative on Monday allowing legal cannabis sales.

While growing cannabis is still illegal, cannabis shops — known as coffeeshops — in 10 municipalities will be allowed to sell marijuana from 10 licensed producers.

“Weed was sold here legally for 50 years, but the production was never legal. So it’s finally time to end that crazy, unexplainable situation and make it a legal professional sector,” Rick Bakker, commercial director at Hollandse Hoogtes, one of the regulated producers, told The Associated Press.

Some 80 coffeeshops are taking part in the experiment which advocates hope this will ultimately end a long-standing legal anomaly — you can buy and sell small amounts of weed without fear of prosecution in the Netherlands, but growing it commercially remains illegal.

Bakker's company in Bemmel, near the German border, is indistinguishable from the surrounding greenhouses producing tomatoes and peppers. But it makes 200 kilograms (440 pounds) of weed per week and is one of the largest producers in the experiment.

A trailblazer in decriminalizing pot since the 1970s, the Netherlands has grown more conservative. 

, long a magnet for marijuana smokers, has been closing coffeeshops in recent years and has banned smoking weed on some of the cobbled streets that make up its historic center.

Advocates have been pushing for a legal growing for years, citing the safety of the product as well as concerns about crime.

Dutch cannabis growers welcome expansion of state-run experiment to make sales legal

This report evaluates the economic impacts of legalising and regulating cannabis for adult non-medical use in the UK from a Treasury perspective of income and spending. The report focuses on government revenues (corporation and income tax, VAT, National Insurance, licensing fees, and, in the scenario of a state monopoly model, profits), savings across the criminal justice system (CJS) from reduced costs on enforcement, and the costs of administering a regulatory model.

For Transform, economic arguments for cannabis, though significant, are secondary to public health and social justice policy priorities. But the economic dimensions of the cannabis reform debate are undoubtedly gaining
political salience, particularly as governments face growing budgetary pressures. Public support for cannabis reform, particularly for economic reasons, such as disrupting illegal profits and the potential tax income, is growing in both the U.S. and the UK.

This report analyses three different regulatory scenarios:

1. Home-grow provision for personal use, and non-profit membership-based associations, with no commercial retail

2. Hybrid model including home grow, non-profit associations and regulated commercial retail

3. A Hybrid model Home grow, non-profit associations, and commercial retail operating under a state monopoly (profits on retail sale accrue to the state)


Regulated drug markets

Dutch hashish only in 10 towns as legal marijuana trial moves on

Reviewing the coca leaf’s international status: A chance to heal what Prohibition broke

Transitioning to legality: How to regulate the adult use cannabis market in Colombia

State adult-use cannabis policy effects on law enforcement efforts to disrupt drug markets

'Changing the current drug policy regime has become a life cause for me' – An interview with Colombia’s ambassador-at-large for drug policy, Laura Gil

Thailand’s cannabis U-turn: Operators have weeks to adapt as recreational use faces ban

Thailand’s cannabis U-turn: Operators have weeks to adapt as recreational use faces ban

XTC Expo – Final report

Thailand set to U-turn on recreational cannabis use

Thailand set to U-turn on recreational cannabis use

Dutch cannabis growers welcome expansion of state-run experiment to make sales legal

High returns: The economic benefits of UK cannabis legalisation