Wednesday, 25 February 2026 / 14:00 - 15:00 (London) - 

The tenth edition of the IDPC webinar on the regular session of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) focuses on its 

, which will take place in Vienna from 9-13 March 2026.

The webinar will shed light the key issues that are likely to structure the debates, discuss tabled resolutions and opportunities for engagement, and showcase the experience of IDPC network members in navigating and leveraging this forum for political advocacy.

This event will be available in English, Spanish and French.

CND 69: Key issues and opportunities

Judgment of the Court in Case C-271/23 | Commission v Hungary (Rescheduling of cannabis)

Hungary, which cannot argue that the common position is unlawful, infringed the European Union’s exclusive external competence in that field, and acted in breach of the principle of sincere cooperation.

In November 2020, the Council of the European Union adopted a decision on the common position to be taken by the Member States, on behalf of the European Union, at the subsequent session of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs. The purpose of that common position was, inter alia, to amend the scheduling of cannabis and cannabis-related substances in two United Nations Conventions, namely the Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, following a recommendation by the World Health Organization.

When voting on those recommendations, Hungary’s representative not only voted in breach of the common position adopted by the Council, but also made a statement contradicting that common position.

In view of that situation, the European Commission brought an action for failure to fulfil obligations against Hungary. According to the Commission, Hungary infringed the European Union’s exclusive external competence and the Council decision on the common position, and acted in breach of the principle of sincere cooperation. In its defence, Hungary argued, principally, that that Council decision was unlawful.

In its judgment, the Court rules in favour of the Commission and finds that Hungary failed to fulfil its obligations under EU law.

The Court notes that the Council Framework Decision on drug trafficking defines the concept of ‘drug’ by referring to the two abovementioned United Nations Conventions. Decisions amending the scheduling of substances in those conventions can affect the application of the penalties laid down in that framework decision, and therefore can affect and alter EU law directly. The adoption of a position to be taken by the Member States on behalf of the European Union with regard to such decisions thus falls within the European Union’s exclusive competence.

Hungary disregarded that competence in the present case by acting in the way it did. That Member State thereby also infringed the Council decision on the common position that had been adopted in exercise of that exclusive competence.

Under the principle of sincere cooperation, the Member States are required to facilitate the achievement of the European Union’s tasks and must abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of common objectives. In the present case, by voting, within an international body, against a common position of the Council, Hungary compromised that principle as well as the principle of unity in the international representation of the European Union and its Member States. By disassociating itself from the common strategy established within the Council, it weakened the European Union’s negotiating power with regard to the other parties to the Convention.

Lastly, the Court states that, in the context of an action for failure to fulfil obligations, a Member State cannot properly plead that an act of an institution, body, office or agency of the European Union is unlawful. That would amount to allowing a Member State to take the law into its own hands by first infringing EU law and then waiting for the Commission to bring proceedings against it by way of an action for failure to fulfil obligations. That would run counter to the principle of the rule of law and the duties of solidarity which are accepted by the Member States and which form part of the fundamental basis of the legal order of the European Union. The position could be different only where the Member State challenges an act that contains such particularly serious and manifest defects that it could be categorised as a non-existent act.

If the Court of Justice finds that there has been a failure to fulfil obligations, the Member State concerned must comply with the Court’s judgment without delay. Where the Commission considers that the Member State has not complied with the judgment, it may bring a further action seeking financial penalties.

Hungary infringed EU law by voting against the Council’s common position regarding the rescheduling of cannabis, EU Court rules

Statement to be delivered at the 68th Reconvened Session of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs

I am making this statement on behalf of the International Drug Policy Consortium and 56 other civil society, community and Indigenous organisations, regarding the outcome of the critical review of the coca leaf by the World Health Organization’s ECDD.

We express our profound disappointment at the decision by the ECDD to keep the coca leaf within schedule I of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.

The coca leaf is a plant that has been cultivated and used by Indigenous Peoples in the Andean-Amazonian region for ancestral, religious, cultural, nutritional and medicinal purposes for millennia. The inclusion of the plant in Schedule I of the Single Convention was a historical error, based on deeply flawed, racist studies and arguments.

Dismantling the colonial legacy of the UN drug control regime, and aligning international drug policy with human rights - including the rights of Indigenous Peoples - was a key reason for Bolivia’s request to initiate this critical review in the first place.

And yet, the ECDD recommendation to keep the coca leaf in Schedule I of the Convention fails to redress the historical wrong committed in 1961. It overlooks the millennia of Indigenous knowledge of the coca leaf - and sidelines the rights of Indigenous Peoples to self-determination, to the use of their natural resources, and to the preservation of their culture, traditional medicines and health practices. It also fails to adequately reflect new evidence of the therapeutic, nutritional and industrial uses of the coca leaf which are now widespread in the Americas and other parts of the world.

Furthermore, the critical review process has given little to no attention to the additional human rights impacts of retaining the coca leaf in the 1961 Single Convention. Today, thousands of families depend on coca cultivation to survive. Militarisation and forced eradication campaigns, especially in fragile ecosystems and Indigenous lands, have caused devastating harms for affected communities’ right to safe water, to food security, to health, and to a healthy environment, as well as the right to life - as coca farmers and human rights defenders in cultivation areas have faced violence and death as a result of punitive policies.

This critical review process once again showcases the inability of the international drug control system to question the failings of the punitive paradigm, to better align with human rights principles - which should be at the core of the UN system as a whole - and to move towards meaningful reforms.

In the midst of geopolitical turmoil, a funding crisis, and UN system reform, this was an ideal opportunity for the UN drug control system to show that it can adapt, repair past mistakes, and confront and dismantle colonial legacies. The ECDD has failed to do this, and is simply propping up an outdated regime that has so clearly failed to achieve any of its stated objectives.

European Network of People who Use Drugs (Ireland)

Washington Office on Latin America (United States of America)

New Zealand Drug Foundation (New Zealand)

Students for Sensible Drug Policy (SSDP) - United States and Global

Finnish Association for Humane Drug Policy (Finland)

Institute for Policy Studies, Drug Policy Project (United States of America)

International Network of People who Use Drugs - INPUD (UK, Global)

Ukrainian Network of People who Use Drugs - VOLNa (Ukraine)

Belgian Network of People who Use Drugs - BeNPUD (Belgium)

México Unido Contra la Delincuencia A.C. (México)

Drug Policy Alliance (United States of America)

International Coalition For Drug Policy Reform & Environmental Justice (Global)

Transform Drug Policy Foundation (United Kingdom)

RESET - Drug Policy and Human Rights (Argentina)

International Indigenous Drug Policy Alliance (Global)

Aboriginal Drug and Alcohol Council South Australia

Suar Perempuan Lingkar Napza Nusantara (SPINN), Indonesia

Association for Humane Drug Policy (FHR) (Norway)

Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Masyarakat (Indonesia)

Zimbabwe Civil liberties and Drug Network (Zimbabwe)

Intercambios Civil Association (Argentina)

Groupement Romand d’Études des Addictions (Switzerland)

Indonesian Harm Reduction Network (JANGKAR, Indonesia)

UNIDOS - Rede Nacional de Redução de Danos (Moçambique)

Africa Network of People Who Use Drugs (Africa)

La Testería / Barbies Testeadoras del Bajío (México)

A critical failure of a system still mired in the past - IDPC joint statement at the CND Reconvened 68th Session

The reconvened 69th session of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs is expected to take place on 3-4 December 2026 in Vienna, Austria.

Reconvened CND 69th Session

The 68th session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) takes place at the Vienna International Centre (VIC) between 9-13 March 2026. For general information on the CND, check out the dedicated section of our website on 

Side events at the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) 69th session (9–13 March 2026) are open to Member States, UN entities, intergovernmental organisations, and NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC. Events must be thematically relevant to the work of the Commission, and each organiser may submit only one application.

Applications for CND side events are open from 5 to 23 January 2026 

and are considered on a first come, first served basis, with priority given to Member States. Proposals must include a title, description, organiser details, and the event modality (in-person, online or hybrid). Only co-organisers listed at the time of submission will appear in the official programme.

Side events are self-serviced by organisers and can be held in-person, online or in hybrid format. Event links for online or hybrid meetings must be submitted by 25 February 2026 and will be published in the UN Journal. Interpretation services are not provided.

69th session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND)

The consumption of the coca leaf in its raw form by millions daily across the Andes carries no significant risks, but official coca control strategies are associated with “substantial public health harms,” according to a review commissioned by the World Health Organization. Filter viewed an advance copy of the report that was distributed to members of the WHO’s Expert Committee on Drug Dependence (ECDD).

Coca, the mildly stimulating and medicinal leaf that is the base ingredient of cocaine, was banned globally by the UN in 1964 after its investigators claimed coca leaf chewing is “definitely harmful” and “the cause of racial degeneration of many population groups.” A WHO paper also described the use of the calcium-rich plant as “a social evil.”

But despite US-backed militarized efforts to eradicate coca leaf production in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador throughout the decades-long drug war, the consumption of the plant—which for many Indigenous communities holds profound spiritual value—has remained stubbornly prevalent, with production in Colombia at all-time highs.

“Research reviewed for this report did not reveal evidence of clinically meaningful public health harms associated with coca leaf use,” states the comprehensive scientific review commissioned by the ECDD. “The research record does, however, robustly document the substantial public health harms associated with coca control strategies at all scales.”

WHO review: Coca not harmful, prohibition is

Despite rift with U.S., can Colombia revolutionize global drug policy?

Earlier this year, world leaders agreed on a landmark resolution to review the global drug policy regime during the 68th session of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs in Vienna. For more than six decades, international drug policy has been largely shaped by the U.S.-led “War on Drugs,” which has prioritized strict controls and punitive enforcement.

Now, there is increasing global recognition that existing policies have failed. Both drug production and consumption are higher than ever. In 2023, 316 million people consumed illegal drugs worldwide, a 22 percent increase from a decade prior. Cocaine is the fastest-growing illicit drug market, and nowhere has it grown faster than in Colombia. Between 2014 and 2023, coca cultivation in the country—which supplies 67 percent of the world’s coca—surged by 266 percent, according to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime.

As the failures of prohibitionist policies have become more apparent, alternative approaches are gaining ground. Colombia, in particular, is trying to flip the script by spearheading global action for drug policy reform.

Yet whether Bogotá can transform the rigid U.N. drug system remains uncertain. Gustavo Petro, Colombia’s first avowedly leftist president, has pushed a progressive drug policy abroad. But he relies on the United States for counternarcotics aid and security cooperation, and this week, Washington decertified Bogotá as a drug control partner for the first time in nearly 30 years, with U.S. President Donald Trump saying that it is “failing demonstrably” in its counternarcotics efforts.

Drug education curriculum in many countries remains abstinence-based and delivered through a criminalization lens. This approach not only excludes young people but also fails to equip them with the knowledge and tools they need to stay safe — whether they choose to use drugs or not. Youth RISE’s research revealed how current drug education — often focused on fear-mongering and reproducing punitive approaches — misses the mark. By the time young people received formal lessons, many had already encountered drugs, formed their own perceptions, distrusted educational institutions and, in some cases, experienced punitive policing firsthand. 

The research shows that young people want a gradual, repeated, and practical education that helps them understand how drugs work, how to navigate situations where drugs are present (whether these are used or not), how to respond to peer emergencies, and how to stay safe and reduce harm. That demands culturally sensitive approaches that recognize young people’s diverse backgrounds and life experiences, rather than imposing a one-size-fits-all narrative. Evidence shows that young people respond well to experiential, interactive learning methods rather than fear-based messaging. 

During Youth RISE’s side event at the 68 CND session, experts emphasized that harm reduction education should be age-appropriate, while recognizing young people's evolving capacities. Schools should be educational environments equipping pupils with the needed tools to critically engage and respond to everyday life decisions and challenges. Instead of reproducing punitive drug policy approaches, schools should function as safe spaces for open discussions about drugs, without fear of punishment or judgment.

Youth RISE: Promoting harm reduction & drug policy reform

Make sure to also check out our post-CND webinar: CND68 and drug policy reform: Unpacking key implications

The 68th session of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) was marked by two parallel and overlapping crises that exacerbated each other. First, the ongoing breakdown of the ‘Vienna spirit’ – the set of practices that created for decades an appearance of universal support for the global drug control regime. Second, the emergence of the new Trump administration, which came to power just before the CND. The USA immediately halted almost all funding to the United Nations (UN), which was already ensnared in a serious liquidity crisis, whilst challenging many of its norms and institutions. Both are historical developments whose impacts will unfold over the years. However, several tentative lessons can be drawn.

The end of consensus may transform the CND into a vibrant policy making body – if Member States are willing to seize this opportunity.


For decades, adherence to consensus kept the CND locked in a stagnant policy space, repeating old language and ignoring the failures of the existing system. But after a historical vote in 2024 on harm reduction, consensus finally collapsed in 2025, with all six resolutions adopted by a vote. Delegations that want to move the global conversation forward can now bring resolutions on topics that were previously blocked by a few Member States. Negotiations are likely to be more time-consuming, and resolutions may become fewer. But this may yet turn the CND into a vibrant multilateral body, with more diplomacy, debate, and evidence-based policy making.

No ‘safe’ or ‘technical’ topics will offer protection from polarisation.


This year, resolutions on conventional themes such as the prevention of drug use or the protection of law enforcement officers were hotly debated until the last moment and brought to a vote. There is no refuge from polarisation at the CND. In view of that, Member States may want to use their time and resources to address topics and language that move the international discussion forward, rather than vainly attempting to play it safe.

The independent review panel presents a historical opportunity, but some countries may attempt to challenge its legitimacy.


In a historical development, the CND agreed to establish an independent expert panel to review the UN drug control machinery, with 30 votes in favour, 18 abstentions, and only 3 votes against. Colombia’s sustained diplomacy reassured other countries that it was not trying to impose its own policy views, but to address through the multilateral system a problem that has threatened its stability for decades. However, many countries would have preferred a weaker review mechanism, and will look at the process with circumspection. If they cannot control the process, repressive countries may play to these fears by portraying the panel as an attempt to usurp the role of the CND.

Colombia and its allies will have to work hard to preserve a global majority for reform.


The Colombian resolution was backed by a new global majority, with support from countries across all regions. Only Argentina, Russia, and the USA voted against. Such a coalition would have been unthinkable just a few months before. However, positions are likely to continue realigning in the coming years, often influenced by dynamics beyond the CND and drug policy debates. In this unstable landscape, Colombia and its allies will struggle to maintain the unity of the 60 country-strong coalition that called for a revision of the international drug control framework in 2024.

The second Trump administration will keep bringing to Vienna its reactionary culture wars. 

The origin of this reactionary agenda must be found in US domestic politics and in the preferred tropes of the global far right. So far, the main targets have been the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, transgender persons, and the World Health Organization (WHO). As it is fitting with this ideology, the USA displayed an overall disrespectful tone, shamed its historical allies, was inflexible in negotiations. Threats, tariffs, and mockery left the USA isolated this time around, with Argentina as its only partner. But the Trump administration is unlikely to stop pushing this agenda across the UN.

It remains to be seen whether the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) and the CND will resist the temptation to accommodate the demands of the Trump administration. 

The USA still holds huge political influence and budgetary leverage. At this CND session, it made clear that it would only fund UN activities that align with ‘America first’ principles. Statements by the UNODC and INCB on border control and interdiction seemed designed to appeal to Washington D.C. Furthermore, this year the USA still managed to water down resolutions, although it was always going to vote against them. Other Member States may want to reconsider their openness to negotiate with a country that is unwilling to make a deal.

Positions on harm reduction and human rights are evolving, but the UNODC remains biased towards the conservative end.


There are countries from different regions on both sides of each of these debates, and barriers are more porous than they used to be. However, the UNODC continues to be rigidly isolated from other UN entities in refusing to express support for harm reduction and to acknowledge the human rights costs of drug control. At the same time, the UNODC has skirted the necessary neutrality by calling for a return to consensus – a hotly debated political issue in Vienna on which a UN entity should stay impartial.

As environment and Indigenous rights grow in importance, Vienna needs to break the silo with UN bodies on these matters.


This year featured the first-ever CND resolution on the environment, which included a specific recognition that drug policies themselves can have a harmful impact – also a first. Greater attention to Indigenous Peoples is also welcome, but this brings the risk of a lack of alignment between drug policy texts and already existing standards on the rights of Indigenous Peoples. To resolve this tension, there needs to be better engagement between the CND and already existing UN bodies integrating Indigenous peoples, as well as increased Indigenous participation in Vienna.

Civil society and community participation has been greatly impacted by funding cuts; this threatens the value of the CND as a global drug policy conference.


The reduction of international aid by the USA and other countries has had a devastating impact on harm reduction services across the world, putting at risk the life and health of people who use drugs. They have also decimated the presence of representatives of civil society and affected communities at this year’s CND, particularly those coming from the Global South. This weakens the role of the CND as a global conference on drug policy.

The ‘Vienna Spirit’ shatters: Report of the 67th session of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs and its high-level segment

Stuck in the inertia of the past: Report of the 66th session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs

The 65th session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs: Report of proceeding

The 2021 Commission on Narcotic Drugs - Report of Proceedings

The 2020 Commission on Narcotic Drugs - Report of Proceedings

The 2019 Commission on Narcotic Drugs and its Ministerial Segment: Report of Proceedings

IDPC report of proceedings: The 2018 Commission on Narcotic Drugs

IDPC report of proceedings: The 2017 Commission on Narcotic Drugs

IDPC report of proceedings: The 2016 Commission on Narcotic Drugs and its special segment on preparations for the UNGASS on the world drug problem

IDPC report of proceedings: The 2015 Commission on Narcotic Drugs and its special segment on preparations for the UNGASS on the world drug problem

IDPC report of proceedings: The 2014 Commission on Narcotic Drugs and its High Level Segment

IDPC report of proceedings: The 2013 Commission on Narcotic Drugs

IDPC report of proceedings: The 2012 Commission on Narcotic Drugs

IDPC report of proceedings: The 2011 Commission on Narcotic Drugs

IDPC report of proceedings: The 2010 Commission on Narcotic Drugs

IDPC report of proceedings: The 2009 Commission on Narcotic Drugs

IDPC report of proceedings: The 2008 Commission on Narcotic Drugs

IDPC report of proceedings: The 2007 Commission on Narcotic Drugs

Vienna after consensus: Report of the 68th session of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs

On the eve of her departure from her post as the Ambassador of Colombia to Austria and Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Vienna, we spoke to Ambassador Laura Gil about her time in Vienna, her achievements, the challenges she faced as well as her hopes for the future of international drug policy.

As the Ambassador At-Large for Drug Policy, she worked with other Member States to break the long-standing Vienna consensus on drugs which led to the first ever resolution that specifically mentioned ‘harm reduction’ being adopted by vote in 2024, while at the last CND in March 2025, Colombia led a resolution that creates an independent expert panel that will conduct a long-over review of the UN drug control ‘machinery’. Her leadership has been exceptional and sets a new high bar for inclusive and engaged diplomacy at the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. She leaves Vienna in mid-July 2025 to take up a new position in Washington DC as the Assistant Secretary-General of the Organisation of American States. We produced this video in cooperation with the 

, and the reporter was Ann Fordham, executive director if the IDPC.

Ambassador Laura Gil (Permanent Representative of Colombia to the UN in Vienna):

 As a Colombian, I feel that the current drug policy regime has wronged my country in so many ways that I think it is a life cause to change it. I like to have a system that moves away from Prohibition. I know it's hard, I know it will take a long time, but I think it will be the only way to make drug policy coherent and to save lives.

 Eventually, it will happen. Perhaps not in my lifetime, but it will happen. Civil society has been working for so long trying to get this regime changed, and the feeling that there's a little hope that this might happen fills me with satisfaction. If you talk honestly, with purpose, sometimes agreements can be reached. And in the end, the best one can do is to try. Because oftentimes I thought: well, why am I going to try this in Vienna? Nothing is going to happen in Vienna. And look, it did happen. So one has to try. The worst that can happen is that one will fail.

: Good afternoon. My name is Ann Fordham. I'm the Executive Director of the International Drug Policy Consortium. And I'm here with you, Ambassador Laura Gil, in your beautiful residence in Vienna. And outside, they're preparing your leaving do, as you're about to leave us for an exciting new position at the Organization of American States. Over the last two years that you've been here with us in Vienna, you have been so inspirational. So many of us from civil society and other member states have admired your courage, your leadership, your honesty, and how you've always been very clear about how the war on drugs has been extremely harmful for so many people around the world, especially people back in your home country of Colombia. You've had so many incredible achievements, which we'll talk about in a minute. But first of all, let me ask you: how are you feeling as you're about to leave Vienna?

: Sad, very sad. I feel that I would have wished for more time here to finish some things I've begun. But, you know, life has a way of surprising you, and now it's taking me somewhere else. Yes.

: Yeah, and this topic of drug policy reform — I’ve observed you for the last two years in Vienna — seems to have really inspired you and captured your imagination in some way. What is it about the issue of drugs and drug policy that has made you so engaged and committed to this work?

: Being Colombian, I guess. As a Colombian, I feel that the current drug policy regime has wronged my country in so many ways that I think it's a life cause. My life cause. I discovered here in Vienna that it has become my cause. It was not only my work, it has become my cause. I am absolutely convinced that if you want to save lives, if you want to show solidarity, if you want to make the world a better place, we need to change this really, really antiquated — and, you know, the global drug regime is an antique already. We should just save it, you know, as an antique to show it. But we have to change it.

: Absolutely, Jurassic. Jurassic, absolutely.

: So, looking back at your time here in Vienna, what would you consider to be your greatest achievements with relation to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and perhaps the broader international drug control system?

: What I think I leave behind is a coalition of 62 countries. And if you ask what is the most important thing I did, I think this coalition is the most important thing. And the members of this coalition have the responsibility to nurture it, to keep it alive. This is a coalition that is not only on paper, that awakens when a statement needs to be signed or something needs to be said. This is an active coalition, a strategic coalition that met in this room — in this very, very, you know, in this room — periodically, sometimes weekly, sometimes every two weeks. Not a month went by without a meeting of the coalition here. So that coalition feeds on dialogue and on compromise. I would like to see this coalition alive and well from where I'll be sitting in Washington, D.C. So, you know, when I arrived in Vienna, I arrived feeling defeated because I was sent here — I was Deputy Foreign Minister — and I was sent here. And my feeling was, what am I going to do in Vienna? Nothing ever happens in Vienna. This is going to be the most boring job I will ever have because I will not be able to change anything in Vienna. And now I'm leaving with a sense of purpose and satisfaction, and knowing that whatever we did here in Vienna began something, stirred something up. Civil society has been working for so long trying to get this regime changed. And the feeling that there's a little hope that this might happen fills me with satisfaction.

: And you have given so many of us that hope — that that’s possible. Under your guidance here in Vienna, Colombia has undoubtedly played a leading role in calling for a more humane and evidence-based drug policy. And of course, while you've made many achievements, what would you say have been your biggest challenges operating also in this very traditionally rigid space of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs?

: Well, let me begin by saying this: I never intended to play a leading role in anything. I am a builder of things. So what I wanted is for Colombia to have partners — good partners. I wanted Colombia to play well and to play fair. So we dedicated as much time from the weakest to the strongest, from the smallest to the largest — we dedicated a lot of time to engage with every single member of this community here in Vienna. The biggest challenge I faced is the question of responding to those who give their backs to scientific evidence. It is very hard when you are in one of those rooms at the UN to have one country get up and say things like, 'Oh, the largest number of overdoses are caused by cannabis.' We heard that in the room. And the diplomatic setting doesn't give you enough room to be able to reply to every single fake news voiced by a country. So for me, that was very, very hard — not only in terms of work, but personally.

: You've set a new standard, I think, for inclusive diplomatic engagement in this setting. And it's been, again, just incredible to watch you operate. And one of the major milestones that you've achieved during your time here was the resolution that just passed at this last CND that sets up an independent panel to review the UN drug control machinery, as is written in the resolution. Can you share what your hopes are that this panel will achieve and why it's so important?

: Well, I think an independent review of the global drug regime was overdue. I mean, Colombia can get up — and Colombia and many partners of Colombia can get up — and claim that this regime is not delivering. But we need some independent voices to do so. And I think this panel gives us an opportunity to say the areas in which it may be delivering something. Who knows? Maybe there are some. I fail to see them, really. That’s why we need someone else to judge this regime — because I fail to see any… any, you know, the results of this regime. But that’s why we wanted some independent body that would take a critical look and tell us what’s working and what’s not working. And I hope that’s the beginning of change.

: Under your leadership, Colombia really brought a strong focus on human rights, development, and peace building to the drug policy debate here in Vienna. How can the UNODC and the CND continue the momentum for that important work?

: Okay. UNODC will not do anything by itself. Unless countries — member states — are there to press UNODC to do the right thing, UNODC will not do it. And I like to remember: when I first arrived, I went to a gathering organised by civil society with member states, and I was mentioning how Colombia was ready to break the Vienna Consensus because we would no longer abide by a consensus that does not serve my country. And as I was saying that, you know, I could see the audience rolling their eyes, thinking, 'Oh, we’ve heard that before — it never happened.' And I was absolutely convinced that I would make that happen. And I made it happen — with a harm reduction resolution. But it was a huge political cost for my country. And it was something that — for Colombia — harm reduction is very important. We’ve been doing harm reduction since 2000-something, 2007. The current government, the current president, when he was Mayor of Bogotá, he made harm reduction one of the most important public health policies he had. So harm reduction was very important. But the issues that Colombia faces go well beyond harm reduction. I mean, harm reduction was fundamental for European countries who have harm reduction in their European Union’s drug policy. But none of the European countries were authorised to break the consensus. We took it upon ourselves to do this because we thought it was the right thing. It was not the most important thing for Colombia — but it was the right thing to do. We did it. And then UNODC did not even mention it [harm reduction] in the World Drug Report. Not in the one immediately [prior], not in this one. Actually, I even said — as I said my farewell words at the CND — that I was leaving without the dream of actually seeing harm reduction in the World Drug Report. So the only way to keep UNODC honest is to have member states engage with them and press them to do the right thing. You know, I did not hesitate to send notes verbales showing our disappointment. I think more countries perhaps could consider doing something like that. UNODC — when we talked to them about harm reduction — the answer was, 'Well, it is not accepted by every single member state.' Well, they are part of the secretariat. It’s a resolution. It was voted. It had the votes. It won. So it is not for them to judge whether it is an acceptable concept or not. It is a concept. It is a policy adopted by a UN body — period. So I think we need a new UNODC. And I hope one of the things the panel actually looks at is this very, very dysfunctional architecture of drugs — beginning with UNODC. Because you see, for Colombia the problem is the following. Colombia is the fourth largest donor to UNODC. Most of the implementation of our policy — drug policy — is done through UNODC in Colombia. So you have this really funny situation — well, funny is not the word, because it didn’t make me laugh — but very paradoxical situation in which UNODC in Colombia, they pretty much tell you everything you want to hear because they need your money, and here they push back on everything you do.

: Indeed, it's deeply dysfunctional. And on the issue of harm reduction, civil society is also incredibly frustrated with the position that the UNODC continues to take on harm reduction. And of course we were so emotional and inspired when the resolution finally got through — breaking the consensus in decades at the CND to get harm reduction into a resolution explicitly stated by the CND. So that was really an incredible watershed moment for civil society.And on the topic of civil society, you have always been an incredibly powerful advocate for the meaningful participation of civil society. You've engaged so constructively with civil society, sought input from civil society, and really taken guidance from them. What advice do you have for other member states and for the UNODC for how to further ensure the meaningful and inclusive participation of civil society in these drug policy debates?

: How to lose fear. It’s very simple to lose fear. I think member states fear civil society. And I come from civil society. I have nothing to fear. I know that one can build partnerships — real partnerships — with civil society. And to be truthful, I would not have done any of what I did if I had not worked so closely with civil society, for several reasons. As I said, when I arrived, I was basically resigned to the fact that I was not going to be able to do anything in Vienna — that this was the place where nothing happens. So it was through talks with civil society that I found a roadmap. The roadmap Colombia had here was collectively built. It was not the ambassador thinking in an office, you know: 'what to do next?' We built this with national civil society and with international civil society. And then we discussed it with the coalition members. Colombia didn’t do what Colombia wanted, you know? To go back to the resolution of the panel — the panel, the resolution is not the one we wanted. We would have wanted something much stronger. We would have wanted much more participation from the Secretary-General. But it's what Colombia negotiated — managed to negotiate. And I'm proud of the negotiation because the negotiation is what's going to make it legitimate. It’s what’s going to make this report — whatever comes out of this report — real for discussion. Had I just counted the numbers and said: 'okay, we're going to plough through and get the win anyway,' I think the report would turn dead on arrival, basically. So, that sort of, openness to dialogue, I think, is what marked our relationship with civil society. It is in the DNA of my government to have this sort of relationship with civil society. But it goes, I think, further than that — because it was easy for me. It was easy in the sense that I didn’t have to do it as a job. I built sincerely with civil society. And I think whatever we got — good or bad — we got it together.

: We did. And I think it’s fair to say that from civil society’s perspective — at least from IDPC and many of our colleagues — we felt your partnership and your collegiality and collaboration very strongly, and we will miss it dearly. And we hope that, yeah, you’ve set a good example for other member states to demonstrate what can be done when you do it in partnership with other member states — but also with civil society. In the next few months, the World Health Organization will release its recommendations for either the de-scheduling or the rescheduling of the coca leaf from the UN drug control treaties. Can you say a few words about why this process has such critical importance for Colombia?

: For Colombia, it has a huge importance because, first of all, it’s a matter of fixing a historical wrong — about how the coca leaf was scheduled. But it goes beyond that. It will give support — political support — to what the government wants to do, which is to find some industrial use of the coca leaf. Right now — and for as long as cocaine is not regulated — we have a plant that is valued by our Indigenous Peoples, and it’s being satanised outside Colombia — it’s being demonised outside Colombia. So we have this plant that grows freely in my country, and we need to do something with it — something that can compete with the drug dealers. So I only see two options: Either you go for the regulation of cocaine and you make this a legitimate business — you know, we are very far from going in that direction. The other direction is to find some industrial use for this coca plant so that the peasants in my country can find another way to make money. So, independently of what happens with WHO, I think both Bolivia and Colombia have made their best efforts to present their case. We'll see what happens. But as we were preparing the documents, the plant itself has been so demonised that we didn’t even have research to show that the coca leaf is not harmful to your health. We did have research — we didn’t have as much as we wanted — and I have been trying to do a number of things: trying to bring the plant to Europe to do research on the plant and to see other alternatives — medical alternatives, some sort of... And it is very, very hard to find a way, a legal way to get the plant out of Colombia. One could be very sarcastic and say that as soon as something is suspected that can be done with this plant, of course we will move into regulation very quickly because those who want to make money will like to have all the patents. So, we are stuck right now. We cannot move on research — although actually the conventions allow them — but try to get a permit to do research on a plant! And, then, the question of patents. In my country, some populations are very scared that if we do not protect the plant, eventually some use will be found and someone else will patent that use.

: I mean, genuinely, that seems to be a real concern. And how best can we protect against that? The sort of corporate capture of the coca plant?

: I think we need to do a state-to-state agreement. We are proposing one to Czechia. We’ll see if that works. That’s one of the things I’m leaving without having finished. But we are proposing to Czechia that, under their new regulation, they help us do research on the plant.

: So, with respect to Geneva, we see that Colombia has become more actively engaged than ever in relation to the Human Rights Council. Can you share a little about how Colombia incorporates human rights into its broader foreign policy objectives?

: Traditionally, Colombia has always been open to scrutiny. Even though we had a very serious and concerning human rights situation inside the country, we realised very, very early on that international actors were there to help us — not to attack us. So we opened up to scrutiny generally in human rights in the early 1990s, which was quite notable back then. And since then, we have incorporated — we have integrated — human rights into practically every aspect of foreign policy. For a long time, Colombia was very afraid of the Human Rights Council because we thought: 'Well, why would a country with so many human rights problems be part of it?' And now we are part of it. We were elected this year, and we will make our membership in the Human Rights Council count — for drug policy. We have several things we want to do there. We want to make the issue of drugs and human rights a permanent item of the Human Rights Council. And we hope to have the support of OHCHR to do that. It will be hard, but we need more reports for discussion — like the one Commissioner Türk presented a few years ago. Yes, with all our national failings — you know, we’re very far from being the country that fully respects human rights — we’re far from that. But it’s always been our aspiration. And I think that’s what’s reflected in our foreign policy. We are committed to making human rights one of the pillars of our international engagement.

: Following the recent resignation of Ghada Waly, what do you think should be the requirements for the new Executive Director of UNODC? What should they seek to achieve?

: Well, I think what a senior international official should do is provide assurances to all countries. So, I think what we’ve seen so far at UNODC is that they seem to be part of the conversation — they take sides in the conversation. I want a UNODC that is willing to ensure that the conversation can take place without bias, that it can guarantee, facilitate, and most of all implement the decisions of member states. It’s not for UNODC to decide which decisions they implement and which they don’t. That’s for member states to decide. So, I want someone who is visionary, who can speak directly to member states, who is respected by member states. You know, I’ve been thinking a lot — now I’m going to hold a senior position in a regional organisation — and I’ve been thinking: well, how do I want to position myself now that I’ve seen what I like and don’t like here in Vienna? I want to be like Rafael Grossi, not like Ghada Waly.

: Maybe you could say a little bit about what are the key differences between those two individuals?

: Well, one very simple one. Rafael Grossi is always there. He’s always present for every member state in every meeting. Ghada Waly is never there. Rafael Grossi is the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency — quite popular these days, or quite popular with some countries — but he’s in the news a lot given the Iranian–Israeli–United States strikes. But, for me, he is what you need in an international civil servant. And I would like to be able to show as much enthusiasm, energy, and acceptance by member states in Washington as Grossi has been able to obtain here in Vienna. So being present and guiding member states. Being present, listening, talking. I think the most we can do from international organisations is to make sure the conversations take place. Provide the space for difficult conversations to take place. We cannot go and decide for member states, but we need to be able to provide the space for the conversations to take place and to respect the decisions of member states.

: I understand this was your first job in a diplomatic posting. For those outside of the profession, it often seems that this space in Vienna is quite rigid and fossilised, but it also must have had some upsides. What have you come to appreciate about diplomacy in these past two years?

: What I’ve been telling all my colleagues is that being straightforward pays. I think the way I talk — without beating around the bush, being very clear, concise, straight talk — I think that was so weird in Vienna that it actually broke with unwritten rules. And I think that would be my message to everyone: just say what your country needs. Don’t decorate it too much. Say it.

: You have certainly done that. And so what is your top recommendation for the next Ambassador of Colombia?

: Look, right now what I think is that we have done the things we needed to do. Right now, we need the carpentry — you know, we need to make sure this panel is put in place. There are powerful forces trying to keep it from being put in place. So I want my successor to concentrate on this and to be able to guarantee that Colombia’s resolution is not put aside.

: As you leave this role for the OAS, how do you think you will stay engaged on the issue of drug policy reform? What opportunities might there be there for you to continue with this work?

: I’ll be in a different position where drugs will not be part of my portfolio. But as I said, this for me has become a life cause. It has become a life cause because it matters to my country, but it has become my life cause because it’s a human rights cause. So I will keep engaged with Vienna. I will come visit you. I will keep up with the developments, and whenever I see an opportunity, I will use it. As I said, I will not be in a position where I could push forward the progressive views I have on drug reform. But I think my region also needs to have difficult conversations. And I will make sure that I can help provide the space to have these difficult conversations. We guarantees to all, of course, but I think we cannot keep on postponing some conversations. And as difficult as they might be, the negotiated resolution on the panel showed me that if you talk honestly, with purpose, sometimes agreements can be reached. And in the end, the best one can do is to try. Because oftentimes I thought, well, why am I going to try this in Vienna? Nothing is going to happen in Vienna. And look — it did happen. So one has to try. Try. The worst that can happen is that one will fail.

: Indeed. As you prepare to leave us here in Vienna, what are your hopes for the future of the international drug control system? What changes would you like to see in the next five to ten years?

: I’d like to have a system that moves away from Prohibition. I know it’s hard. I know it will take a long time. But I think it will be the only way to make drug policy coherent and to save lives. I want a drug regime that turns its back on Prohibition. The end of Prohibition — eventually. It will happen. Perhaps not in my lifetime, but it will happen.

: And finally, what message would you like to give to civil society and drug policy reform advocates who are working tirelessly to shift the regime away from Prohibition and towards health, human rights, peace and development?

: Laura, thank you so much for everything. And yeah, it’s very difficult to accept that you will no longer be here in Vienna with us. As we started the interview — I mean really — you have been inspirational for so many here in Vienna. And as you said, that was kind of the strapline: 'Nothing ever happens in Vienna.' You know, it was a moribund and sort of seemingly hopeless place for progress before you came along and you breathed fresh air and fresh energy into this debate. And yeah, I think many of us who’ve been working here for a long time do feel reinvigorated by your presence and re-energised and more hopeful — even though you won’t be here with us. But you’ll still be with us, I believe. So thank you so much. And we wish you all the best in Washington. And yeah — please come visit us often.

: Thank you. I’m sure I’ll be here. I told you — it has become a life cause for me.

'Changing the current drug policy regime has become a life cause for me' – An interview with Colombia’s ambassador-at-large for drug policy, Laura Gil

 opened a door for a conversation that could get the world to rethink how to deal with drugs.

 on March 14, 2025, calling for an independent panel to review the implementation of the international drug-control treaties. Notably, the voting displayed unity between global North and global South countries, with the 30 votes in favor of the resolution aligning several European, Latin American and African nations, as well as Japan and South Korea.

This vote presents a historic opportunity for reform — as well as for UN Secretary-General António Guterres to cement his legacy as a leader in public health.

I have spent the past three decades championing a nonpunitive, evidence-based approach to drug policy. In the last several meetings of the Vienna-based Commission on Narcotic Drugs (

), we have witnessed a shift in thinking, bolstered by the decision to stop requiring all resolutions to be reached by consensus (dubbed the “Vienna spirit”).

Eighteen countries abstained from voting on the resolution, with just three voting against it: Russia, Argentina and the United States.