WOLA promotes human rights, democracy and social and economic justice in Latin America and the Caribbean.

WOLA promueve los derechos humanos, la democracia y la justicia económica y social en Latinoamérica y el Caribe.

WOLA promeut les droits humains, la démocratie et la justice économique et sociale en Amérique Latine et dans les Caraïbes.

Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA)

WOLA and Amnesty International are hosting a conversation on U.S. military action in the Caribbean.

The Trump administration has conducted lethal strikes against civilian vessels in the Caribbean, killing 61 people as of late October, claiming it’s engaged in a “non-international armed conflict” with narco-terrorist organizations. What are the legal, human rights, and geopolitical implications? Join experts on international law, drug policy, Venezuela, and civil liberties for a dynamic discussion.

Hybrid Event | 1666 Connecticut Avenue NW or online

Uncharted waters: U.S. Military action in the Caribbean

, remain a public health emergency, demanding effective public health solutions for U.S. families and communities struggling with substance use. However, current actions by the Trump administration as responses to overdose deaths (particularly those related to fentanyl) have instead focused on the use of lethal force against individuals suspected of transporting drugs abroad, most notably the killings of at least 65 civilians in military strikes in the Caribbean.

, these killings are unlawful under domestic and international law. Moreover, as shown over decades of supply-focused interdiction efforts, the use of force to block or destroy drug shipments does not curtail U.S. illegal drug availability or consumption, nor does it weaken organized crime.

As of November 1, the known death toll from 15 lethal U.S. strikes on civilian vessels is 65.

Drug traffickers in South America do not produce or traffic fentanyl.

International Narcotics Control Strategy Report

 stated: “The Department of State, in consultation with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and other relevant agencies, has identified 

”—especially its northwest, 3,000 miles from Venezuela—“as 

the only significant source of illicit fentanyl and fentanyl analogues

 significantly affecting the United States during the preceding calendar year.”

There is no proof that it [fentanyl] is manufactured or trafficked from Venezuela or anywhere else in South America

 in December 2023, “so far the National Police has not detected any fentanyl production laboratory in Colombia.” A senior police official told WOLA that year that the country’s few detections of fentanyl had been stolen from hospitals or pharmacies.

Most cocaine does not transit the Caribbean; the Pacific route is far more common.

 by criminal activities, and there is evidence of 

 between government officials and illicit economies, including drug trafficking, fuel trafficking, illegal mining, and money laundering. The dismantling of democratic institutions under an authoritarian government allows officials and other actors to act with impunity. However, claims of this country being a source of fentanyl or the main transit country of U.S.-bound cocaine are not supported by evidence.

In its 2020 report with data from 2019, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 

bout 8 percent of U.S.-bound cocaine departed through a “Caribbean corridor,” primarily from Venezuela.

 Another 16 percent departed Colombia (and perhaps some part of western Venezuela) via a “Western Caribbean Vector.” A much larger share — 74 percent — flowed through the Pacific Ocean via an “Eastern Pacific Vector.” Additionally, according to the DEA, “small amounts of cocaine are moved overland from Colombia to Panama.”

 noted that the Eastern Pacific is “the area through which 80 percent of drugs destined for the United States flow.” That would leave 

a maximum of 20 percent for the Caribbean, only some of which would depart Venezuela’s Caribbean coast

“In March 2020, the United States estimated that between 200 and 250 metric tons (MT) of cocaine were trafficked through Venezuela annually,” 

 noted, “A Venezuelan non-governmental organization assessed that cocaine trafficked through Venezuela in 2023 likely persisted at the same levels as the estimated 200 to 250 metric tons (MT) the United States estimated in 2020.”

That amount—enough to fill roughly 3 to 5 semi trailers by volume—represented “

roughly 10 to 13 percent of estimated global production

“Why Blowing Up Venezuelan Boats Won’t Stop the Flow of Drugs.”

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reports a notable decline in national overdose deaths, especially fentanyl, attributable in large part to health interventions.

“Fentanyl was involved in over 76,000 deaths in 2023, according to the new statistics, but just over 48,000 in 2024,” read a 

—in overdose deaths involving fentanyl.

 from over 110,000 per 12 months in 2023 to less than 80,000 per 12 months now. Deaths involving methamphetamine totaled 37,096 in 2024, and those involving cocaine totaled 30,833 in 2024. (Opioid use may have been involved in some of these fatalities).

 that the decline, particularly in fentanyl overdoses, is due largely to health interventions, including the provision of the overdose-reversing medication naloxone, medications for opioid use disorder, and other prevention and response services. 

In spite of this progress, the current U.S. administration and Congress have drastically cut funding for health measures such as these, including nearly 

 in cuts over the next decade to Medicaid, the country’s 

 of treatment for substance use disorders.

Bombings of “drug” targets in the Western Hemisphere violate basic rights and make little or no difference to the drug trade.

A military operation against a drug production target in Latin America, such as a laboratory or a major kingpin, would do only 

minor, fleeting damage to organized crime, from which affected criminal groups would quickly recover

“Between 2019 and 2023, Mexico extradited an average of some 65 wanted criminal suspects per year” to the United States, 

, and hundreds before that. Colombia has 

 over 1,200 people, the vast majority to the United States, during its past three presidential terms. Many other major drug traffickers have been killed. 

None of these “kingpin” operations has affected drug supplies

 in the United States or weakened organized crime, as evidenced by reported inflation and purity-adjusted drug prices on U.S. streets, which have not increased in a way that scarcity would indicate. 

If the people aboard the boats targeted so far were indeed involved in smuggling illegal drugs, they would have played minor roles in vast transshipment networks and will be easily replaced within the drug trade, even as their deaths fail to be investigated.

Calling them “terrorist” or “narco-terrorist” 

 unlock war authorities or permit military strikes.

Drug supply-reduction efforts, including those that deploy military assets and use of force, have no lasting impact when they leave in place the ungoverned territory and unpunished corruption that allow organized crime to thrive, fueled by the massive profits of supplying demand for prohibited substances. This reality is especially relevant when weighed against the illegality and cost in lives of current military strikes in the Caribbean.

Though U.S. Southern Command no longer shares this information, during the late 2000s and early 2010s, it routinely 

between 350 and 700 suspected maritime drug trafficking vessels

 of all smuggling vessels transiting the Pacific and Caribbean each year. As of now, 15 boat strikes have already led to 65 people being killed; if the plan is to try to attack a greater percentage of smugglers, 

these unlawful, lethal strikes could increase to hundreds

The U.S. military has interdicted cocaine in the Western Hemisphere since the 1980s, but there is no authorization for the use of lethal force against civilians

In the late 1980s, the U.S. Congress made the Department of Defense the single lead agency for overseas interdiction of illegal drugs.

 reads, “may operate equipment of the Department to intercept a vessel or an aircraft detected outside the land area of the United States for the purposes of (A) 

directing that vessel or aircraft to go to a location

 designated by appropriate civilian officials.” That specifically worded language 

 those aboard the craft, especially without a self-defense justification.

In the decades since this provision became law, Navy and Coast Guard personnel have boarded an unknown but substantial number of vessels, interdicting thousands of tons of drugs, principally cocaine.

Commanders of U.S. Southern Command have often told Congress that they want more detection, monitoring, and interdiction 

They have never called, however, for the ability to carry out extrajudicial killings.

We need an honest assessment of our approach to illegal drugs that recognizes the limits and harms of a supply control drug strategy

The focus on drug production fails to acknowledge that U.S. drug markets are robust, fed by substantial demand. Demand is strong despite the adoption of prohibition policies that boost the profitability of these products, further enriching organized crime. No successful approach can treat this as simply as a supply issue.

Traditional indicators of supply control efforts, such as hectares of crops eradicated, tons of drugs seized, and the number of people arrested, convey a misleading sense of decisive action and progress. Illicit drug markets are dynamic, and drug traffickers hedge against inevitable product losses by ensuring ongoing production, by constantly experimenting with new distribution routes and modes, and by bribing and coercing government officials.

Effectively addressing violence related to the illicit drug trade should be a shared priority for governments in the region, as should evidence-based strategies to reduce the lucrative nature of drug trafficking for criminal actors. However, describing drug traffickers as “poisoning” consumers in the United States fails to take into account the need to also 

, investing in evidence-based prevention, treatment, harm reduction, and recovery efforts

The U.S. should focus its assistance on bolstering civilian justice institutions and strengthening the rule of law. For decades, U.S. administrations from both parties have backed foreign security forces with billions of dollars in aid, equipment, and training in the name of disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking organizations. These efforts have not slowed the flow of illicit drugs, but have often undermined human rights and citizen security. U.S. support should be directed at fortifying civilian justice institutions and the rule of law, and establishing a strict zero-tolerance policy for human rights abuses by U.S. personnel and recipients of U.S. security aid and training.

Facts to Inform the Debate about the U.S. Government’s Anti-Drug Offensive in the Americas

“President Trump has secretly signed a directive to the Pentagon to begin using military force against certain Latin American drug cartels that his administration has deemed terrorist organizations,” the 

 on August 8. “The order provides an official basis for the possibility of direct military operations at sea and on foreign soil against cartels.”

Using U.S. military force overseas against profit-seeking criminal organizations would be a grave mistake. If carried out in other nations’ territories without their governments’ consent, it would be considered a “breach of the peace” or an “act of aggression” under the UN Charter, or an “armed attack” under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. In Latin America and the Caribbean, where sensitivities about U.S. military intervention are strong and cut across the political spectrum, few would find claims of “self-defense” convincing, and relations could be set back for many years.

International norms, though, are far from the only reason why military interventions against organized crime would be grave mistakes. They don’t make sense either practically or strategically. Here are five reasons why.

US: Five reasons why Trump’s anti-cartel military plan will fail

Yesterday, the President of the United States 

 a video that appears to show a U.S. military strike on a boat off the coast of Venezuela. President Trump’s social media post stated that 11 of those aboard were killed. 

So far, the only publicly available information about this incident is the video that President Trump shared and brief statements from the Secretaries of State and Defense. Much remains to be learned about exactly what transpired, and Pentagon officials have said that they intend to provide additional details.

Ascertaining the legitimacy and legality of the use of force in this case will depend on the factual answers to numerous questions. It is not clear whether the U.S. military forces deployed to the southern Caribbean tried to contact the people aboard the boat, tried to board the boat, fired warning shots, or tried to disable the engine by firing on a part of the boat where humans were not present. U.S. authorities should also address the question of whether there is any evidence that those aboard were threatening U.S. personnel in a way that would justify using lethal force in self-defense.

If the evidence shows that the U.S. military, apparently on the orders of President Trump, engaged in the unlawful use of force that caused the deaths of 11 people in international waters, those responsible, especially at the political and military command levels, must be held accountable in the U.S. criminal justice system and under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The U.S. Congress should also require the Administration to disclose all the relevant facts.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said in an 

 on September 3 that he watched the video live and that those under his command knew “exactly who was in that boat, we knew exactly what they were doing, and we knew exactly who they represented, and that was Tren de Aragua,” referring to a Venezuelan gang. Hegseth went on to say that “this is a deadly serious mission” for the Trump administration and that the operation “won’t stop with just this strike, anyone else trafficking in those waters who we know is a designated narcoterrorist will face the same fate.” 

What we have seen so far suggests that the U.S. armed forces did something that it has never done, to our knowledge, in more than 35 years of military involvement in drug interdiction in the Caribbean Sea: an instant escalation to disproportionate lethal force against a civilian vessel without any apparent self-defense justification.

In the late 1980s, the U.S. Congress made the Department of Defense the single lead agency for overseas interdiction of illegal drugs. In the decades since, Navy and Coast Guard personnel have boarded a large number of vessels, interdicting thousands of tons of cocaine and other drugs. WOLA has sought to monitor those activities, and we know of no cases of those military and Coast Guard personnel using lethal force during these operations without a claim of self-defense.

Using lethal force on suspicion of illegal activity violates the letter and spirit of more than a century of international standards and the United States’ own regulations for maritime operations against civilian vessels in international waters. These measures include the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (

UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs

 on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, the Defense Department’s 

 of Engagement and Standing Rules for the Use of Force (though key language in the counter-drug section is classified).

These measures all call for restraint in the use of force, especially lethal force, when the lives of civilian non-combatants are at risk: a gradual and proportionate response that carefully escalates force in order to avoid exactly the kind of outcome that President Trump’s video depicts. These standards explicitly or implicitly prohibit the use of lethal force when there is no self-defense justification.

The President claimed that the people aboard the boat were carrying “illegal narcotics,” though he did not specify the type or amount of drugs. But proportionality in the use of force is a fundamental principle of international law. Mere suspicion of carrying drugs, or merely being pursued by (much faster) naval vessels or other military assets in international waters, are not offenses that carry a death sentence, much less summary execution.

 that the president “has been clear that the days of acting with impunity and having an engine shot down or a couple drugs grabbed off a boat, the – those days are over. Now it is we are going to wage combat against drug cartels that are flooding American streets and killing Americans.” If yesterday’s act is a harbinger of more U.S. military actions involving excessive force when conducting drug interdiction operations, then it sets a bleak and dangerous precedent for more unlawful killings and violations of fundamental human rights principles, and threatens to undermine international norms that serve to prevent and to punish lawlessness on the seas.

It’s also essential to consider the context in which this strike occurred, particularly the increasing tensions in U.S.-Venezuelan relations amid the U.S. military buildup in the Caribbean. As WOLA highlighted previously, this 

 began following the Trump administration’s designation of the Cartel de los Soles as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGTs) group in early August. (Rather than a hierarchical organization, this group is more like a label for the nexus of relations between Venezuelan government officials and drug traffickers.) This move came with an increase, to $50 million, in the reward that the administration is offering for information leading to authoritarian leader Nicolás Maduro’s capture.

In their comments about the strike, President Trump and Secretary Hegseth both claimed that those aboard the boat were members of Tren de Aragua, the Venezuelan criminal group that the administration 

 as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in February 2025. According to an August 2025 

 by InSight Crime, this networked Venezuelan crime group has been declining in power and has not been linked to “cases of large cocaine shipments… especially not in connection with the U.S. market.”

Pending greater clarity than we have now, we cannot ascertain how yesterday’s strike may fit into a broader U.S. strategy of escalating pressure on the Maduro regime. To be sure, the situation of impunity in Venezuela allows illicit economies, including illegal drug trafficking, to operate with the acquiescence and complicity of government officials. At the same time, any use of military force, whether by the U.S. or other governments, must abide by prevailing international laws, norms, and standards.

Lethal U.S. military strike on alleged drug traffickers sets a dangerous precedent in the 'war on drugs'

For the second year in a row, what had been an uneventful, consensus-driven United Nations meeting on drug policy saw unexpected drama and signs of real change.

At the 68th session of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) in Vienna in March 2025, governments approved the formation of an independent expert commission to recommend changes to the architecture of global drug policy, which has changed little since the early 1960s.

Colombia again played a catalytic role, as it did in 2024. But this time, the United States—under the new Trump administration—tried to block nearly everything, isolating itself diplomatically in the process.

In this episode of the WOLA Podcast, Adam Isacson speaks with three experts who were in Vienna:

, Executive Director of the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC), a network of 195 organizations working to reform global drug policy.

, Senior Coordinator for drug policy at DeJusticia, a Bogotá-based think tank and advocacy group.

, WOLA’s Director for Drug Policy, who has tracked the UN’s drug control system since the 1980s.

The conversation traces the slow evolution of the UN drug control system—from decades of punitive consensus to today’s shifting coalitions, unprecedented votes, and long-overdue reviews.

Much of the episode centers on a breakthrough: a new resolution establishing an “independent external review” of the UN’s own drug control institutions. For years, countries like Colombia have called for an honest assessment of the system’s failings. Now, thanks to a resolution spearheaded by Colombia and passed over U.S. opposition, that review is happening. The details still matter: how independent the expert panel will truly be, who funds it, and whether the review can influence the hard architecture of the drug control treaties.

“Vienna was very much a space where delegates would just pat each other on the back on how well we’re doing the war on drugs,” Pereira said. “The spirit of Vienna created a sort of lockdown situation on debate, true debate,” added Walsh. “Civil society enlivened the Vienna atmosphere” in recent years, he noted, “with new debates, new arguments.” Now, this international space has become more dynamic.

The guests also discuss coca leaf: its decades-old listing as a Schedule I narcotic, Bolivia’s and Colombia’s ongoing push for a scientific review, and the possibility of a pivotal vote in 2026. They stress how traditional knowledge—especially from Indigenous communities—must be recognized as legitimate scientific input during that review.

Underlying it all is a major diplomatic shift. Colombia is using the UN system to demand drug policy grounded in health, human rights, and development—not militarized prohibition. But with Petro’s term ending in 2026, it’s unclear who will pick up the baton.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration is signaling a return to zero-tolerance drug war policies—and burning bridges with potential allies in the process. “They behaved so terribly. I mean, they broke with all diplomatic niceties,” said Fordham. “The U.S. just went for it in their opening statement… It was frankly an embarrassing, but also pretty shocking statement.”

Despite the uncertainty, all three guests agree: civil society is no longer on the sidelines. NGOs and experts are shaping debates, challenging rigid thinking in Vienna, and holding governments to account.

CND68: Historic vote initiates overdue review of UN drug control ‘machinery,’

” Ann Fordham, Adrià Cots Fernández, International Drug Policy Consortium, March 18, 2025.

A Historic Vote at the CND: Colombia Challenges the Global Drug Control System

,” Isabel Pereira Arana, DeJusticia, March 18, 2025.

CND 2025: What future for the UN drug control system?

” TRANSFORM Drug Policy Foundation, March 23, 2025.

When the Adult in the Room Is Gone: Trump’s Budget Cuts and Global Drug Policy

,” István Gábor Takács, Drug Reporter, April 2, 2025.

Download this podcast episode’s .mp3 file here

, or wherever you subscribe to podcasts. The 

Global drug policy: “Countries are being freed up to actually speak their minds”

The US government has officially designated several Latin American organized crime groups as terrorist organizations, but the move will do little to help attack these complex criminal networks.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced February 20 that the Venezuelan mega-gang Tren de Aragua, the MS13 street gang, and the Sinaloa Cartel, Jalisco Cartel New Generation (Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación – CJNG), Gulf Cartel, Northeast Cartel, Familia Michoacana, and United Cartels in Mexico would be declared “foreign terrorist organizations.”

The official designation stemmed from an executive order US President Donald Trump signed on his first day in office announcing his intention to make this decision.

“The Cartels have engaged in a campaign of violence and terror throughout the Western Hemisphere that has not only destabilized countries with significant importance for our national interests but also flooded the United States with deadly drugs, violent criminals, and vicious gangs,” Trump said at that time.

The new designations are likely to put further strain on US-Mexico relations, which are already tense due to Trump’s threats to impose tariffs on Mexican goods and his statements claiming Mexico’s government is controlled by criminal interests. Experts consulted by InSight Crime cautioned that this measure is far from a cure-all for the threats posed by transnational criminal networks and may actually complicate joint efforts to fight them.

“If the question is how to effectively weaken, combat, and dismantle criminal networks in Mexico, then the starting point needs to be addressing them for what they are,” said Stephanie Brewer, director for Mexico at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA).

“Mexican criminal groups are very powerful and cause horrific levels of violence and suffering, but they are not pursuing the type of political ends that a terrorist organization pursues,” she added.

US authorities already have a number of legal tools at their disposal to prosecute criminal leaders, impose financial sanctions, and seize assets. While the US can now impose stiffer penalties on the people they target and obtain warrants under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to carry out their own electronic surveillance, Brewer told InSight Crime that the foreign terrorist designation does not significantly increase the tools needed to combat these groups and risks unintended consequences.

“The concern is that this could open the door to both criminal prosecutions and immigration consequences for a wide range of everyday people, organizations, and businesses on both sides of the border that might find themselves inadvertently caught up in the framework of providing material support to terrorist groups,” she added.

What’s more, the move is based on the premise that these are monolithic groups when they are highly complex, horizontally-integrated organizations with no clear lines separating who is part of the network and who is not. Their use of violence is based on protecting economic interests, not obtaining political objectives or imposing an ideology.

“The designation fundamentally misunderstands how these criminal operations work,” said Cecilia Farfán-Méndez, an expert on organized crime.

What you need to know about the criminal groups the US just labeled ‘terrorists’

The Expert Seminar on Cannabis Regulation aimed to address the evolving landscape of cannabis regulation within the European Union and its intersection with international drug control treaties. Organized by the Transnational Institute (TNI) and co-sponsored by the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) and the Global Drugs Policy Observatory (GDPO), the seminar gathered policy and legal experts from six European countries engaged in various forms of cannabis regulation, five of which are EU member states (Czechia, Germany, Luxembourg, Malta and the Netherlands) and one non-EU country (Switzerland). Also present were experts from the United States of America, where cannabis regulation is in full swing in states and discussed at the federal level, as well as other international policy experts and scholars in international law. Over the course of two days, the participants discussed the current state of cannabis regulation, legal tensions, and future scenarios for policy development.

Cannabis regulation, EU drug law, trade rules and the UN drug control treaties

Amidst proposals calling for U.S. military action in Mexico or further migration crackdowns in response to illicit fentanyl smuggling and drug overdose deaths, experts from both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border will discuss the ineffectiveness and negative impacts of interdiction and militarized drug enforcement policies, while highlighting more effective, evidence-based, and humane strategies to address the overdose crisis. 

Simultaneous English<>Spanish interpretation will be available on Zoom during the event.

Addressing the fentanyl overdose crisis effectively: evidence from the border and beyond

This podcast episode features Kendra McSweeney and Fritz Pinnow, part of a team investigating a new trend: the emergence of coca cultivation in Central America.

McSweeney, a professor of geography at Ohio State University, has researched human-environment interactions, cultural and political ecology, conservation and development, resilience, demography, and land use/cover change. Pinnow is a Honduras-based journalist and documentary photographer specializing in illicit economies, violence and development in Central America.

McSweeney and colleagues have published an article in the journal Environmental Research Letters examining the recent and growing appearance of coca leaf cultivation in Central America, a crop historically associated with the Andean region. McSweeney and Pinnow discuss the environmental and market conditions driving coca cultivation in Honduras and Guatemala. They note that those attempting coca cultivation in the region have competitive advantages over Colombian growers, such as more favorable growing conditions.

They stress that it would be a serious error to respond to this phenomenon with another forced eradication program. Past crop-eradication strategies, which have almost always been uncoordinated with governance, rule of law, basic services, land formalization, or anti-poverty efforts, have failed and in fact ended up encouraging the planting of coca in new areas.

Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA)

Region

Translations

Related Content